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ABSTRACT 
Europe and the United States are displaying an increasing dependence on Russian, 
Caspian and Middle Eastern oil and natural gas. Turkey is geographically in the middle 
of these consumer and producer countries and has an important place in its emerging role 
as an energy hub because of current and future. Turkey has agreements with Russia, Iran, 
Iraq, Qatar, Syria, and Europe in regards to energy. Due to these agreements, Turkey is 
building a web of energy to diversify its energy supply. Some observers think that Turkey 
is establishing its own dependence, and some think that Turkey’s attempts at an energy 
web are about interdependence rather than dependence, in advantage of its energy 
security. The objective of this thesis is to analyze how Turkey’s energy policy—with the 
aim of becoming an energy hub—affects its own and the region’s dependence or 
interdependence in regards to energy security. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
There is an increasing dependence on Russian, Caspian and Middle Eastern oil 
and natural gas by Europe and the United States.1 Turkey is geographically in the middle 
of these consumer and producer countries and has an important place in its emerging role 
as an energy hub because of pipelines that exist, are planned, or are already under 
construction.  
Turkey has agreements with Russia, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Syria, and Europe in 
regards to energy.2 Due to these agreements, Turkey is building a web of energy to 
diversify its energy supply. Some observers think that Turkey is establishing its own 
dependence, and some think that Turkey’s attempts at an energy web are about 
interdependence rather than dependence in advantage of its energy security.3 The 
objective of this thesis is to analyze how Turkey’s energy policy with the aim of 
becoming an energy hub affects its own and the region’s dependence or interdependence 
in regards to energy security.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Turkey’s domestic energy consumption increases at an annual rate of 4.3% on the 
average.4 To meet this increasing demand and to diversify against a dependence on a 
single source of energy, Turkey has sought energy from a variety of sources and 
suppliers. 
                                                 
1  Tuncay Babali, "Turkey At the Energy Crossroads, Turkey Past and Present," Middle East 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads. 
2  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Energy Strategy, January 2009, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Stra 
tegy%20(Ocak%202009).pdf. 
3  Mahir Zeylanov, "Turkey Becomes World’s Largest Energy Hub Through Recent Deals," Sunday’s 
Zaman, August 23, 2009, http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=184792. 
4 Energy, Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Republic of Turkey 




Russia, The Caspian Sea Basin and the Gulf have 71.8% of the world’s proven 
natural gas and 72.7% of its oil reserves.5 Turkey is a neighbor of both these energy 
producing countries and energy consuming Europe. Thus, Turkey is trying to define itself 
as a key country in its position of a natural energy bridge between the source countries 
and consumer markets in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply 
sources and routes, by taking advantage of its proximity to energy giants of Middle East, 
Russia, and Caspian Basin and giant energy consumer Europe.6 
More importantly, Turkey’s energy policy of becoming an energy hub through 
pipelines has acquired increasing importance in the western world, especially because of 
Russia’s energy policy and its Ukrainian and Georgian crises.7 Russia’s energy policy is 
not the only concern for western energy security; it includes instability in Iraq, Iran-U.S. 
relations and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.8 Because Turkey is in this region, Turkey 
needs not only diversification of its energy resources, but also good relations with all its 
neighbors to provide its security.9 Turkey’s policy of “peace at home, peace abroad,”10 
contributes positively to this situation and allows Turkey to be a reliable element for 
energy security.  
Turkey’s geographical location positions it to act as a transshipment country with 
the benefit of diversifying its own energy sources. Turkey’s position appears as the best 
option for Europe that needs “a reliable alternative supply route”11 and suppliers that  
 
                                                 
5  Mehmet Ogutcu and Danilla Bochkarev, "Rivals Become Partners," European Voice, September 21, 
2009, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/09/rivals-become-partners- /65924.aspx.  
6  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Energy Strategy, January 2009, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Stra 
tegy%20(Ocak%202009).pdf. 
7  Alex Petersen, "Russia’s War for Oil Supplies," Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, August 18, 
2008, http://www.ypfp.org/content/russias-war-oil-supplies.  
8  International Energy Agency, Oil Supply Security, www.iea.org/Textbase/about/copyright.asp. 
9  Tuncay Babali, "Turkey At the Energy Crossroads, Turkey Past and Present," Middle East 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads. 
10  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Synopsis of The Turkish Foregin Policy, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa. 
11  Katinka Barysch, "Turkey’s Role in European Energy Security," Centre for European Reform 
Essays, December 2007, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec07.pdf. 
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need a reliable route providing access to world markets. Turkey’s pipelines through Iran 
(despite U.S. opposition), Russia, the Middle East, and Europe create these reliable 
interdependent links.  
This thesis argues that the Turkish energy policy to become an energy hub among 
suppliers and consumers not only contributes to its energy security but also to the 
region’s energy security by creating an interdependence in terms of pipelines from east to 
west and north to south. Even though Turkey’s energy policy towards Iran and Russia 
does not meet U.S. approval due to the ISA (Iran Sanction Act), it contributes to peace in 
the region and satisfies Turkey with pipeline fees and the flow of oil and gas through 
Turkish soil.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major problem regarding the energy security of Turkey is U.S. foreign policy 
to isolate Iran from international affairs by the Iran Sanction Act (ISA) due to Iran’s 
ambitions to obtain nuclear arms. There are, however, positive reasons for adding Iran to 
energy agreements. Due to Iran’s geostrategic location among the Caucasus, the Caspian 
Sea, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan, Iran could extract oil and gas from the Caspian Basin less expensively and more 
efficiently than is currently done. However, the U.S. does not support this because of its 
isolation policy on Iran.12 
Another problem is Iraq and its stability. Turkey supports a secure and united Iraq 
that is not a haven for terrorists.13 However, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a 
terrorist organization positioned in northern Iraq,14 suspicions about the Kurdish 
Regional Government’s intent to gain greater autonomy and become independent from 
                                                 
12  Shah Alam, "Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Sea Basin," Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of 
the IDSA XXVI, no. 1 (January–March 2002). 
13  Brian Katulis, "The U.S. Needs Turkey for Its Middle East Agenda," Atlantic-Community, 
November 23, 2009, http://atlanticcommunity. 
org/index/articles/view/The_U.S._Needs_Turkey_for_its_Middle_East_Agen da. 
14  Serpil Acikalin, "Turkey-Iraqi Relations in Light of Davutoglu’s Visit to Iraq," International 
Strategic Research Organization (Uluslararasi Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu-USAK), August 21, 2009, 
http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=1029.  
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Iraq,15 conflicts between religious and ethnic groups, and the intensity of attacks on Iraqi 
oil pipelines, oil installations and oil personnel16 (469 attacks, which is relatively high, 
from 2003 to 200817 in Iraq) are the main problems in respect to Iraq’s stability that 
could affect oil and gas flow through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Hence, Turkey is 
trying to further increase the amount of trade with Iraq to establish more mutual 
dependence. Besides, Turkey is the main trade partner of Iraq, and Turkey provides the 
only way to carry its oil and natural gas to the European market.18  
Another important problem for energy security is the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. 
In the Middle East, there are increasing tensions between Israel and Middle Eastern 
Muslim countries concerning Palestinians. Turkey is the only country that is known as 
Muslim yet recognizes the independence of Israel. Israel wants to obtain natural gas and 
water through a pipeline from Turkey’s port of Ceyhan.19 Also, Israel has been 
designated as a transit country for Russian and Caspian energy.20 For this purpose, a an 
expanded pipeline is planned to bring oil from the Russia and the Caspian region through 
Ceyhan to Ashkelon and from there to be pumped to Eilat and re-loaded onto tankers to 
be shipped to Asia at more competitive prices and with more capacity than through the 
Suez Canal.21 However, the dispute concerning Palestinians has strained the relations 
between Israel and Turkey and may negatively influence the energy security of Turkey. 
All the problems above are external issues about relations between Turkey and its 
neighbors. However, Turkey also has internal problems with respect to energy security. 
                                                 
15  Lionel Beehner, "The Challenge in Iraq’s Other Cities: Kirkuk," Council On Foreign Relations, 
June 30, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11036/.  
16  Gal Luft, "Fencing in Looters and Saboteurs in Iraq, Energy Security," Institute for the Analysis of 
Global Security, September 29, 2003, http://www.iags.org/n0929032.htm.  
17  Iraqi Pipeline Watch, Attacks on Iraqi Pipelines, Oil Installations, and Oil Personnel, Energy 
Security, March 27, 2008, http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm.  
18  Ibrahim Mazlum, "Twenty First Century Energy Security Debates: Opportunities and Constraints 
for Turkey," in Contentious Issues of Security and The Future of Turkey, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2007), 147. 
19  Gal Luft, "Energy Security Challenges for Israel Following the Gaza War," International Analyst 




Most important is the probability of sabotage on pipelines by the terrorist PKK. Their 
sabotage against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline raised a question about security in 
Turkey with respect to its own and the region’s energy security in August 2008.22 The 
BTC Pipeline is an ideal target for militants wishing to destabilize Turkey. The 669-mile- 
long BTC pipeline is difficult to defend against such militant attacks.23 The continued 
probability of these kinds of attacks on pipelines continues as a security concern for 
Turkey. 
The main opposite hypothesis for the Turkish energy policy is that Turkey is 
increasing its dependence on foreign countries24 with its energy projects between Russia, 
Qatar, Azerbaijan, Syria, and Iran. According to this hypothesis, Turkey’s energy 
agreements have made it too dependent on suppliers, especially Russia. However, Turkey 
needs to meet its domestic requirements. Thus, Turkey needs to diversify its energy 
supplies. To achieve this, it needs to access energy from these other countries. Besides, 
Turkey is the best option for the landlocked Caspian Basin that is heavily influenced by 
Russian foreign policy, isolated Iran, and the Middle East to reach out to western markets 
for reliable transshipment of oil and natural gas to world markets.25 This situation creates 
common interests between Turkey, as both an energy consumer and transit country, and 
the energy producer regions. Consequently, these common interests create 
interdependency.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Energy security is considered the provision of affordable (ability to buy supply at 
relatively stable and reasonable prices), reliable (predictable supplies that are less and 
less vulnerable to disruptions), and ample supplies of oil and gas (ensuring that a large 
                                                 
22  Greg Bruno, "Turkey at An Energy Crossroads," Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 
2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17821/. 
23  Stratfor Global Intelligence, Turkey: Implications of a Blast on the BTC Pipeline, 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey_implications_blast_btc_pipeline.  
24  Mahir Zeylanov, "Turkey Becomes World’s Largest Energy Hub Through Recent Deals," Sunday’s 
Zaman, August 23, 2009, http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=184792.   
25  Chen Ming, "Turkey Emerges as World Energy Hub After Big Deals," Turkish Weekly, August 26, 
2009, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/87662/turkeyemerges- as-world-energy-hub-after-big-deals.html. 
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number of nations with hydrocarbon reserves produce them for global markets).26 
According to the International Energy Agency, energy security is “the uninterrupted 
physical availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting environment 
concerns.”27 It has two dimensions; one of them is the view of the importing country, the 
other the view of the exporting country. For an importing country (consumer), energy 
security refers primarily to access to the sources and security of supplies,28 for an 
exporting (producer) country, energy security needs to have access to markets and 
security of demand.29  
Turkey is a natural energy corridor between consumers and producers. According 
to Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform (CER), “Turkey’s natural position 
of being an energy hub contributes to European energy security positively by its 
proximity to resource rich regions in its neighborhood.”30 
Turkey is an energy-transit nation that links Caspian and central Asian suppliers 
with European consumers.31 Turkey's energy issues are not limited to pipeline politics. 
Poor domestic energy supplies, electricity costs, and an overdependence on Russian gas 
raise questions about Turkey's own energy security and Turkey’s position as an energy 
bridge for energy.32 
Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief foreign policy advisor to Turkey's prime minister, 
says Turkey's security interests lie in successfully balancing its role as an energy transit 
country between producers and consumers. According to him, 
                                                 
26  Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, "Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign 
Policy," in Energy Security Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, ed. Jan H., and David L. Goldwyn 
Kalicki (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 9–10. 
27  International Energy Agency, Energy Security, 
http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103.  
28  Mason Willrich, Energy and World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975), 66. 
29 Ibid., 94. 
30  Katinka Barysch, "Turkey’s Role in European Energy Security," Centre for European Reform 
Essays, December 2007, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec07.pdf. 
31  Greg Bruno, "Turkey at An Energy Crossroads," Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 
2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17821/.  
32 Ibid. 
 7
Turkey’s national strategy requires establishing the transit of energy 
across its territory due to its geographical position. Turkey shares common 
interests with Russia, Iran, and the United States for the successful 
operation of natural gas and oil pipelines that run in various directions 
through the Turkish territory. Hence, Turkish analysts try to combine all 
these interests in one single picture. This is a rational calculation, not an 
ideological account. Turkey’s relations with Iran will continue, and efforts 
will be made to preserve its understanding with Russia, based on mutual 
interest. As far as cooperation with the United States in the field of energy 
concerns, the joint projects on the Trans-Caspian as well as strategic 
approach for energy security in global economy will be maintained in the 
most effective way.33  
In this respect, Turkey’s energy policy contributes to mutual interdependence of 
consumer and producer countries rather than dependence on them. The main concern of 
Turkey’s foreign policy is energy. In the energy issue, the main concern is natural gas. 
Turkey made its first natural gas treaty with Russia in 1984 and Russian natural gas is 
carried by a pipeline, via Bulgaria, constructed in 1987.34 Natural gas is a most critical 
commodity, since it is relatively inexpensive and serves as a pollution-free fuel for 
heating and power generation. Using this pipeline, Turkey’s consumption of natural gas 
rose from 1.2 billion cubic meters in 1988, to 50 billion cubic meters in 2010.35 In 1999, 
the only pipeline for natural gas was the one inaugurated in 198736. Turkey needed more 
pipelines to meet the requirements of its own economy and diversify its energy supplies. 
The most obvious alternative suppliers were Iran, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Egypt, and the 
Caspian Basin.37  
Due to energy traffic via straits of Turkey, Turkey has been considered as an 
important key player in the north-south oil route. Also, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
route and the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline promote Turkey’s role as 
an east-west energy corridor. However, while Turkey’s role as an important energy 
                                                 
33  Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," Insight Turkey 10, 
no. 1 (2008), 91–92. 
34  William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000 (London: MPG Books Ltd, 2002), 167. 




player increases, pressure on Turkey increases at the same rate. Turkey needs to balance 
the hegemonic and regional powers. Otherwise, hegemonic and regional powers like the 
U.S. and Russia can have differences with Turkey due to the contrasts between Turkey’s 
energy policies and their interests. For instance, Turkey’s stance in the Russian-Georgian 
War in 2008 upset Russia, and Turkey’s energy agreements with Iran upset the United 
States.38 
The emergence of the Caspian Basin as a significant source of energy has 
changed Eurasia and given Turkish policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus an 
important new dimension. Although initial estimates of Caspian oil reserves have been 
highly exaggerated, these reserves are still important.39 Caspian resources are landlocked 
and to get the energy to international markets, new pipelines need to be built.40 Turkey 
provides almost the only opportunity for Central Asian and Caucasus countries to reach 
the international markets, if they want to escape the influence of Russia. Turkey has 
basically three goals in the Caspian Basin: economic benefits deriving from the transit fee 
income; the reduction of Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas and Middle Eastern oil; 
and, employment opportunities that pipeline constructions would create in less developed 
eastern Turkey.41 Even though Turkey considers economic goals in the Caspian, Russia, 
the EU and the U.S. mainly consider Turkey’s role in the Caspian as political. Turkey and 
the Caspian Basin play a crucial role in U.S. strategies to enhance western influence and 
to match Russian influence in Central Asia, as well as to maintain the U.S. containment 
policy against Iran.42 The U.S. wants an uninterrupted flow of oil and gas from the region 
                                                 
38  Tuncay Babali, "Turkey At the Energy Crossroads, Turkey Past and Present," Middle East 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads. 
39  F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa 
Monica, California: RAND National Security Research Division, 2003), 107. 
40 Ibid., 108. 
41  Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads Ottoman Legacies and A Greater 
Middle East (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 186. 
42  Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads Ottoman Legacies and A Greater 
Middle East (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 186. 
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and would like to ensure pipeline security by restricting Iranian and Russian influence on 
oil and gas exploration, development, and pipeline routes.43 
Despite frequent Iranian declarations of contracts and partnerships, since 2001, 
Turkey has been the only significant importer of Iranian gas. Turkey signed the Iran 
contract in 1996, during the tenure of the Refah Party, whose leader Necmettin Erbakan's 
Islamist leanings later led to public pressure for his resignation.44 The U.S. was clearly 
unhappy with this project due to the ILSA (Iran-Libya Sanction Act), but Turkey was 
anxious about its demand for natural gas, so Turkey continued to establish strong ties 
with Iran and Russia in regard to natural gas pipelines. Energy has been a driver behind 
the warming of Iranian-Turkish relations. Iran is the second-largest supplier of natural 
gas to Turkey (after Russia). In July 1996, shortly after taking office, Turkish Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan concluded a $23 billion agreement for the delivery of natural 
gas from Iran over 25 years. In February 2007, under Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey 
and Iran agreed to seal two new energy contracts: one allowing the Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation (known as TPAO) to explore oil and natural gas in Iran and another for the 
transfer of gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey (and on to Europe) through a pipeline in 
Iran.45 
Arrangements with European Union member states on the Nabucco natural-gas 
pipeline, with Russia on the competing South Stream project, with Qatar on liquefied 
natural gas and a possible pipeline, with Azerbaijan on gas supplies for its isolated 
Nakhchivan autonomous region, and with Syria on gas-imports are the indicators of  
 
 
                                                 
43  Shah Alam, "Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Sea Basin," Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of 
the IDSA XXVI, no. 1 (January–March 2002).  
44  Tuncay Babali, "Turkey At the Energy Crossroads, Turkey Past and Present," Middle East 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads. 
45  F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey Rediscovers The Middle East," Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 
(July/August 2007): 103–114. 
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Turkey's energy aspirations.46 For that reason, Mahir Zeynalov from Zaman, an 
influential newspaper in Turkey, emphasized Turkey as the “World’s Largest Energy 
Hub.”47 
Turkey is really becoming the world’s largest energy hub that establishes a bridge 
between east-west and north-south by its pipelines: -east-west pipelines of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project (BTC), the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, the South Caucasus 
Pipeline (under construction), the Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas Pipeline (under construction), 
the Nabucco Gas Pipeline (projected), the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (projected), the 
Kazakh-oil expansion to BTC (projected), the Iraqi Gas (projected) and North-South of 
Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, the Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass Oil Pipeline (projected), the 
Burgas-Alexandropulos Oil Pipeline-Bypass for straits (projected), the Samsun-Ceyhan 
Pipeline (projected), the Turkey-Israel Oil/Gas Pipeline (projected).48 
Turkey’s energy policy is driven mainly by its domestic needs.49 Turkey’s energy 
production is insufficient for the country’s needs. Turkey is a developing country and 
needs energy to sustain its economic growth. To sustain that economic growth, it has to 
make enormous efforts to increase its energy imports as well as develop its own resources 
and improve energy efficiency, due to the lack of its known own oil and natural gas 
reserves.50 Thus Turkey is attempting to improve its energy requirements by making 
agreements with energy giants Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea Basin countries and the Middle 
East. Sometimes it contrasts with U.S. and European countries. The United States and 
                                                 
46  Alexandros Petersen, "Turkey’s Multivector Energy Hub: Ignore At Your Own Peril," Radio Free 
Report Radio Liberty, August 31, 2009, 
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Essays, December 2007, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec07.pdf. 
50  Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 13.  
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European countries have tensions with Russia and Iran on energy, but Turkey has to 
improve its energy needs to meet its domestic requirements.  
In this thesis, the author argues that Turkey’s attempt to improve its energy needs 
contributes to its energy security as well as the region’s (EU, Russia, Iran, Middle East 
and Caspian Sea Basin) energy security by mutual interdependence. Its attempts to build 
more pipelines from east to west and north to south contribute to more energy security by 
mutual interdependence. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the Turkish energy security policy as well as the region’s 
energy security. Initially, this thesis analyzes Turkey’s energy structure and its attempts 
to meet its own needs. Subsequently, it examines the impacts of these attempts on the 
region. Finally, this thesis analyzes the challenges of being an energy hub or corridor.  
1. Thesis Synopsis 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter covers the background of 
energy security and Turkey’s energy security issues. This chapter provides initial 
information and clarifies the research question of the thesis. It gives information and the 
background of the main research question. 
The second chapter covers Turkey’s energy policy and explains why Turkey 
chooses to be an energy hub or corridor for its energy security. It has two sections. First, 
it covers Turkey’s energy outlook, and second, Turkey’s energy policy before and after 
the Cold War. 
The third chapter analyzes Turkish energy security and how Turkey’s methods to 
maintain its energy security contribute to the region’s energy security. For that reason, 
the thesis analyzes pipelines between energy consumers and suppliers. 
The fourth chapter examines the challenges to Turkey’s and the region’s energy 
security. It examines Russian, U.S., EU and Iranian foreign policies, instabilities of the 
Middle East, and Turkey’s problems with terrorism. 
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The last chapter provides a conclusion. It analyzes Turkey’s attempts to establish 
interdependence among energy consumers and suppliers to take advantage of its energy 
security and meet its domestic energy needs. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Energy security is one of the main challenges of the post-Cold War era. 
Developed and developing countries are dependent on energy- producing countries. 
However, energy producers sometimes use their energy supplies as a strategic weapon to 
leverage their political aims. This creates an unsecure situation between consumers and 
producers. In this thesis, the author examines Turkey’s natural energy corridor situation 
as a means of interdependence to mitigate the relations between consumers and producers 
in advantage of its energy security. 
Thus, the thesis examines Turkey’s energy relationships between energy 
consumers and producer countries. In this context, the author argues that Turkey’s natural 
energy corridor or hub situation contributes to peace among consumers and producers by 
increasing interdependence. Because of Turkey’s existing, planned and under- 
construction pipeline networks, and its location close to energy consumer markets and 
energy producers, Turkey has a unique position which provides the best option for peace 














II. ENERGY PROBLEMS OF TURKEY 
A. TURKEY’S ENERGY OUTLOOK 
Turkey has a dynamic and growing economy, which is ranked 17th in the world 
in GDP, and a growing population, which is also ranked 17th in the world.51 According 
to the Turkish Statistical Institute’s data, Turkey’s population is around 71 million with a 
growth rate of 13 percent.52 Due to Turkey’s rapidly growing industrialization and 
urbanization, Turkey’s energy demand is increasing. It is expected to grow at the rate of 
6–8 percent per year and the primary energy consumption is expected to double between 
in 2010 with 126 million tonnes of equivalent (toe) and in 2020 with 222 million 
equivalent million tonnes.53 While Turkey meets 30 percent of its total energy demand, 
the rest of its energy demand is being met from imports.54 
Turkey’s total primary energy demand is mostly being satisfied by hydrocarbon 
resources. Oil and natural gas consolidate the almost 65 percent of total energy 
consumption of Turkey (See Figure 1). However, Turkey has very low oil and natural gas 
reserves.55 Turkey produces an insufficient amount of oil and natural gas, and low quality 
and highly polluted lignite coal.56 Thus, Turkey’s energy policy has been highly supply 
oriented.57 
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56  Brenda Shaffer, "Turkey’s Energy Policies in a Tight Global Energy Market," Insight Turkey 8, no. 
2 (April/June 2006), 97.  
57 Ibid., 98. 
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Figure 1.   Total Turkish Energy Consumption58 
Oil contributes 35 percent of total energy consumption. According to the Oil and 
Gas Journal, Turkey’s proven oil reserve is 284 million barrels59 and oil production per 
year is around 46 thousand barrels.60 However, Turkey’s consumption is around 675 
thousand barrels per year. Thus, there is a huge gap between oil production and 
consumption. 
In Turkey, oil consumption has increased steadily, while oil production has 
decreased since 1990 when the oil production was at the peak level. Turkey’s oil 
consumption increased from 7958 thousands tonnes of equivalent petroleum (TEP) in 
1970 to 32551 thousand TEP in 2006.61 However, Turkey’s total oil export is only 6688 
                                                 
58  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, Turkey, Country 
Analysis Brief, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Turkey/Background.html.  
59  General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs (Petrol Isleri Genel Mudurlugu), Statistics (Istatistikler), 
http://www.pigm.gov.tr/istatistikler.php.  
60  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, Turkey Energy 
Profile, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=TU. 
61  Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Istatistik, Birincil Enerji 
Kaynaklari Tuketimi (Primary Energy Consumption), 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/EKLENTI_VIEW/index.php/raporlar/raporVeriGir/4314/2. 
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thousand TEP, while its total oil import was 36681 thousand TEP, in 2008.62 That means 
that Turkey imports five-sixths of its needed oil from abroad. 
In 2008, 2.2 million tonnes of oil and, until today, a total of 1,307 million tonnes 
of oil were produced in Turkey. However, during the last decade, oil production 
decreased 24 percent. Also, the decrease in oil production is expected to continue in the 
future due to no discovery of new oil fields and aging oil fields (See Figure 2).63  
 
Figure 2.   Crude Oil Production between 1999 and 2008 (million tonnes)64 
Unless new oil fields are discovered, Turkey’s total oil reserves will be depleted 
in 19 years by the consumption level of today.65 Thus, Turkey needs to find a way to 
meet its energy demand for oil. Crude oil suppliers of Turkey are Iran, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Syria, Italy, England and Libya.66 
On the other hand, Turkey has chosen natural gas as another energy source, 
because of its growing energy needs, the discovery of giant gas fields in the Middle East, 
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Energy Dengesi (General Energy Balance in 2008), 
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66  Energy Market Regulatory Authority, Petrol Piyasasi Sektor Raporu 2008 (Oil Market Sector 
Report of 2008), http://www.epdk.gov.tr/yayin_rapor/petrol/2008sektorraporu/2008sektorraporu.pdf.  
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Russia and Central Asia, and diversifying its energy supplies.67 Furthermore, natural gas 
is less polluting than coal and oil.68 In the last two decades, Turkey substantially 
transformed its power generation  from coal- and oil-fired plants into natural gas-fired 
plants.69 Thus, Turkey’s natural gas demand is also increasing steadily.  
However, Turkey has very limited natural gas reserves—around 6.827 million 
cubic meters. Turkey produced 1.014 million cubic meters of natural gas in 2008 and, 
until today (See Figure 3), Turkey has produced 10.574 million cubic meters of natural 
gas. Even though Turkey’s natural gas production has increased in the past ten years, it 
will eventually be depleted unless new gas fields are discovered.70 
Turkey started to produce natural gas in 1976 and since then Turkey’s natural gas 
demand has continuously increased. In 1987, Turkey began to import natural gas from 
the Soviet Union, since Turkey could not meet its natural gas demand from its own gas 
resources. 
Turkey imports gas mainly from Russia by blue stream, and to lesser degrees 
from Azerbaijan, Iran, Algeria and Nigeria. Turkey imports from Russia, Azerbaijan and 
Iran by pipelines, but from Algeria and Nigeria as LNG.71 
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2 (April/June 2006), 97. 
70  Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (Turkish Petroleum Corporation), 2008 Yili Petrol ve 





Figure 3.   Natural Gas Production between 1999 and 2008 (million cubic meters)72 
The other energy source for Turkey is coal. Turkey’s total coal reserves are about 
4.614 million short tonnes. Unfortunately, only 7 percent of it is hard coal (anthracite and 
bituminous) and the rest of it is lignite.73 So, most of Turkey’s coal reserves produce poor 
quality and polluted coal.74 Most of Turkey’s lignite production is consumed in coal-fired 
power plants, but Turkey has been trying to replace the coal- and oil-fired power plants 
with natural gas power plants. Turkey mainly imports high quality coal from abroad.75 
Turkey also has a significant potential for renewable energy. Turkey produces a 
robust amount of hydroelectricity.76 Hydropower energy and the seas surrounding Turkey 
are the main sources of probable renewable energy. Especially, Turkey’s hydro- energy 
potential is huge. It is estimated that in 2020, Turkey can meet around 40 percent of its 
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energy demand by hydropower.77 The other renewable energy sources in Turkey are 
solar, thermal, wind, geothermal, photovoltaic energy and new programs such as 
hydrogen energy, and fuel cells.78 
Due to Turkey’s lack of indigenous conventional energy resources, Turkey is a 
net energy importer. According to Turkey’s Foreign Ministry, Turkey meets only 30 
percent of its energy demand.79 The rest of its energy comes from outside of Turkey. 
Especially after the 2001 economic crisis, Turkey’s energy needs increased at the rate of 
8 percent (See Figure 4).80 Thus, the country needs new energy sources. In 2008, 
Turkey’s primary energy demand was 106,338 million tonnes of equivalent petroleum 
and total primary energy production was 29,257 million tonnes of equivalent 
petroleum.81 According to estimates, Turkey’s total energy demand will increase to 222 
million tonnes of equivalent petroleum in 2020.82 It will be doubled compared to 2008.  
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Figure 4.    Primary Energy Consumption83 
Yet, Turkey’s energy production will not increase as significantly as consumption 
(See Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5.    Primary Energy Production84 
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Energy Consumption, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/img/charts/TU_prim_conc_large.png.  
84  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, Turkey Primary 
Energy Production, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/img/charts/TU_prim_prod_large.png.  
 20
Turkey needs new energy resources if the country wants to keep its 6–8 percent of 
average annual growth.85 It is a huge gap to meet. Therefore, Turkey’s primary focus in 
terms of energy is to meet its increasing energy demand by outside energy sources.  
Turkey is and will remain for the foreseeable future an importer of oil and gas. In 
1995, it imported 25.8 million tonnes of crude oil and will reach more than 40 million 
tonnes by the end of 2010, according to energy demand projections. The increase in its 
consumption of natural gas will be even more striking: from slightly less than 10 billion 
cubic meters in 1998 it is expected to use 54 billion cubic meters by 2020.86 For that 
reason, the U.S. Department of Commerce has identified Turkey as a “Big Emerging 
Market,” and has actively encouraged new investment in and exports to Turkey.87 
B.  COLD-WAR ERA 
During the Cold War era, Turkey’s concerns were about security issues. Turkey 
had various relations with the West, the Soviet Union and the Arab Middle East. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s aggressive acts defined Turkish foreign 
policy. The Soviet Union had claims on Turkey’s eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan, 
and demands for a voice over the control of the Bosphorus. Thus, the Soviet Union had 
been at the center of Turkish foreign policy. Because of this, Turkey chose to be a 
member of NATO. After centuries of falling victim to European imperial desires, Turkey 
managed protection within the European system.88 
For the West, Turkey was important due to its location as a buffer between the 
Soviet Union and the Middle East, which ensured that Soviet influence in the region was 
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limited and without territorial expansion.89 Therefore, Turkey and the West had mutual 
interests centered on the Soviet Union. For Turkey and the West, the main question was 
how to ward off the Soviet Union’s threat.90  
Until the 1970s, energy had never been an important issue for Turkish domestic 
and foreign policy. However, a threefold increase of consumption of energy between 
1962 and 1977 caused the rise in Turkey’s dependence on oil.91 Oil prices increased 
fivefold. Crude oil imports had been 60 percent of Turkey’s total earnings in four years 
and exceeded Turkey’s total export earnings by about 30 percent in 1980. This imbalance 
increased  Turkey’s dependence on oil while it raised the inflation rate in Turkey.92  
This energy crisis caused reduction in energy consumption in Turkey. Daily 
power cuts in major cities, interruptions in industrial production, lack of heating in 
houses, and huge lines of vehicles at the pumps for the supplies of petrol were seen. This 
situation demonstrated to Turkey’s politicians the importance of energy in regard to 
political stability, economic growth, national security and domestic policy.93 Therefore, 
the oil crisis of the 1970s built a direct link between energy and foreign policy for the 
first time in the Turkish Republic’s history.94 Starting in the 1970s, Turkey developed an 
economic component to its foreign policy.95 
Turkey, which maintained balanced relations with the Middle East countries and 
Israel until the 1970s, started to expand commercial relations with oil-rich Arab 
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countries.96 As a result, Turkey shifted away from treating the Middle East as a hostile 
bloc; it began to build relationships based on mutual interests.97 
Before the oil crisis in 1973, Turkey’s trade with the Arab countries was about 5 
percent of its overall trade. From 1973 to the 1981, that increased to 34 percent, mostly 
Turkish imports of Arab oil, more specifically Saudi, Libyan and Iraqi oil.98 
In 1977, Turkey and Iraq agreed on building an oil pipeline from Iraq through 
Turkish soil to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast that ultimately brought Turkey revenues of 
up to $1.2 billion dollar a year. 99 
By the 1980s, Turkey was filling the gap in its balance of payments by increasing 
exports of foodstuffs and manufactured consumer goods to Middle Eastern oil-rich 
countries. This was increased by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which caused a jump in oil 
prices.  
The Iran-Iraq war opened other avenues for Turkey. Iran and Iraq, two major oil 
rich countries, heavily depended on Turkey as a transit route and a source of imports.100 
Turkey improved economic relations with Iran during the wartime. Booming relations 
between Turkey and Iran resulted in Turkey’s neutrality to Iran and Iraq. Also, Turkey 
was the only outlet for Iran due to sanctions of the United States. At the end of the war, 
relations with Iran declined due to ideological and political differences, but economic 
contacts remained stable because of Turkish interest in energy deliveries from Iran.101 
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Turkey’s relations with Iraq were much better than those with Iran. When Turkey 
pursued the foreign policy of Kemalist neutrality, Turkey gained a significant economic 
benefit from its wartime trade with Iraq.102 Oil exports were about 96 percent of Iraq’s 
total income.103 Syria had blocked the flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean through the 
Syrian pipeline because Syria supported Iran. Because of Iran, oil transport was risky 
through the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Turkey was the only way for Iraq to transport its oil 
to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.104 During the Iran-Iraq war, the -kilometer- long 
pipeline to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan carried almost 100 percent of Iraq’s 
oil—80 million tonnes annually. For years, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik (Ceyhan) route has 
been the only functioning way of export for Iraq’s oil.105 
In this situation, Turkey was the main beneficiary. Before 1990, Iraq was the 
central oil supplier of Turkey and also played a major role in its international trade. Iraq 
was supplying 250,000 barrels per day to Turkish refineries and to Turkey’s oil terminal 
port of Ceyhan.106 Turkey gained energy resources and transit fees from flow of Iraqi oil 
through Turkish soil and also through cross-border truck trade.107 Turkey’s gain from 
transit fees from the oil pipeline was around $250 million dollars. Turkey’s exports 
increased from $220 million in 1981 to $2 billion in 1985, which was one-quarter of 
Turkey’s overall exports.108 
After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the flow of oil from Iraq stopped. The 
United Nations exerted sanctions on Iraq. Therefore, Turkey and Iraq’s relations  
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ceased. This caused Turkey’s loss of an estimated $30-$60 billion dollars in revenue from 
transit and storage fees and trade and business opportunities, over the following 
decade.109 
Turkey’s energy relationships were about not only oil but also natural gas during 
the Cold War. In 1976, Turkey started to consume natural gas after the oil crisis of the 
1970s. Natural gas was consumed mainly by gas-fired power plants to satisfy growing 
industrial and household consumption of electricity. However, Turkey’s natural gas 
production was not enough. Turkey began to import natural gas from the Soviet Union in 
1987. Since then the Soviet Union, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
been the main supplier of natural gas for Turkey.110 
Until the 1970s, Turkey had never had any energy policy. After the oil crisis of 
the 1970s, Turkey added energy to its foreign policy issues, but Turkey had never 
considered the exploitation of it geostrategic location in terms of an energy policy. 
Turkey’s energy policy during the Cold War focused on meeting the increasing domestic 
demand. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and the foundation of Turkic speaking 
states in the Caspian provide Turkey new opportunities in terms of foreign policy and 
energy. The United States’ east-west energy corridor strategy opened new avenues for 
Turkey to merge its energy policy with foreign policy to meet Turkey’s increasing energy 
demands and enhance Turkey’s national security. 
C. COLD-PIPELINE WAR ERA  
Since the end of the Cold War, energy has become the main issue for developing 
countries, because energy-rich but poor Eurasia has opened its doors to the world. Thus, a 
new cold war started, not between the two super powers but among several regional 
powers. Turkey emerged as a regional power after the collapse of the Soviet threat due to 
its historic, ethnic, and linguistic links with Eurasia.  
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Changing dynamics have shifted the regional powers’ foreign policies in terms of 
energy security. Turkey also shifted its foreign policy from passive and neutral to a more 
active but still dependent on US policy objectives. There are mainly two factors that have 
shaped Turkey’s energy policy: Turkey’s new neighborhood and the huge gap between 
domestic energy consumption and the insufficient energy resources of Turkey.  
Turkey exploits the regional powers’ policies to meet its huge energy demands 
and adapt itself to its new neighborhood. Turkey’s goal to achieve these two important 
objectives is to become an energy hub between the energy rich regions of Eurasia and the 
Middle East, and energy hungry Europe. 
1. Turkey’s Changing Dynamics 
a. New Neighborhood  
During the Cold War, Turkey was only a barricade against the expansion 
of the Soviet Union into Europe and the Middle East.111 When the threat from the Soviet 
Union ended, Turkey, once surrounded by a far more powerful single state, is now 
surrounded by smaller and weaker states.112 
As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic 
importance of Turkey’s military role in the Western camp declined.113 However, in fact, 
Turkey is now in a much more critical condition for Western security by its place near the  
13 regions of 16 potential unstable and risky regions. So, the new security conditions of 
the region have moved Turkey from the status of a flank country into a frontline 
country.114  
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Thus, the old, passive and neutral approach of Kemalist foreign policy 
slowly has given way to a more self-conscious and active foreign policy. In fact, Ankara 
has not severed its Kemalist neutral, pacifist foreign policy, but is redefining its foreign 
policy due to the emerging new security environment.115 As Turkey has become stronger 
and its neighbors weaker, Turkey has gained self-confidence to break out of its 
traditionally passive foreign policy into a more active and balanced foreign policy.116 
b.  Turkey’s Energy Security and Energy Dependency 
After the first oil crisis in 1973, energy had become the main issue in 
Turkish foreign policy. This has been solved mainly by increasing economic relations 
with the Middle East. Unfortunately, again, energy has become the main issue for Turkey 
due to two reasons, since the 1990s. First, Turkey’s energy demands have increased to an 
unprecedented level due to the high rate of industrialization at and the end of the Cold 
War and the transformation of the economy from import-substituted into export-
substituted. Turkey’s energy demand is rising at a rate of 8 percent per year. It is a net oil 
and natural gas importer.117 In addition, its insufficient oil and natural gas reserves are 
expected to be depleted in 20 and 7 years, respectively.118 Therefore, Turkey, which 
imports 70 percent of its energy needs,119 faces an emergency energy problem. 
Second, U.N. sanctions on Iraq after the Iraq war ceased the flow of oil 
through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Turkey’s loss had been high in terms of energy. 
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Since the imposition of sanctions, Turkey has increased its oil purchases from Saudi 
Arabia and Iran,120 influencing Turkish foreign policy.121 
These two reasons pushed Turkey to find a way to meet its increasing 
energy demand. Turkey’s geographic location has emerged as a natural bridge between 
the energy-rich Middle East and newly independent Eurasian states on the one hand, and 
the energy-consuming states of Europe.122 Thus, the demise of the Soviet threat and 
opening of all energy-rich Eurasian states, with which Turkey has linguistic, cultural, and 
ethnic connections, offered Turkey a new opportunity for the country’s energy security. 
Turkish leaders want to participate in the new emerging large oil and gas 
resource of Eurasia, mainly in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Turkey sees 
Eurasia as a means to deal with Turkey’s rising energy demands.123 
2.  Convergences and Divergences of Regional Powers’ Policies 
Since the end of the Cold War, two goals of Turkey’s energy policy have been to 
secure new energy supplies, and establish the country as the transit route for energy flows 
from Eurasian energy-rich countries to consumer markets of Europe.124 The U.S. offered 
Turkey the opportunity to become an energy hub with the U.S.’ East-West Energy 
Corridor Strategy providing two new opportunities for Turkey. First of all, the US offered 
to solve  Turkey’s energy problem by the construction of the East-West energy corridor. 
If oil and gas flow to Turkey, Turkey can meet its increasing energy demands. Second, 
Turkey has an opportunity of merging its energy policy with its security policy. If Turkey 
becomes an energy hub, it will secure its national boundaries from any attack and any 
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ethnic conflicts by providing interdependence among all transit, producer and consumer 
countries in its new although more risky environment.  
However, Turkey wants to be an energy corridor not only between energy rich 
Eurasia and energy hungry Europe. Turkey wants to be an energy hub between all 
regional energy rich countries and energy hungry Europe. For that reason, Turkey’s 
energy policy sometimes clashes with the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Europe. So Turkey 
wants to add Russia, Iran, Iraq and even Egypt to its energy hub strategy. 
Turkey’s energy strategy has mainly four pillars: Pipelines, the U.S. East-West 
energy corridor policy, energy reserves of the Middle East and the North-South-South-
North energy corridor policy. 
a.  Pipelines 
Pipelines are the most efficient way of transporting large quantities of 
hydrocarbons across long distances.125 Especially, they are the best medium for exporting 
natural gas from the Middle East and Eurasia, because piping natural gas directly from 
the producer is far more economical, even though natural gas can be transported in the 
form of liquefied natural gas by tanker as can oil.126  
Transportation of oil and natural gas is a high-reward business. Transit 
countries gain substantial income from transit fees. Also, pipeline construction and 
operation provide jobs and support infrastructure for local economies.127 Large transit 
revenues improve the social welfare for all groups and strengthen the status of the ruling 
regime. So, it promotes national unity and decreases  ethnic tensions.128  
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The pipelines cause geo-political dependency for producer countries.129 A 
transit country’s political stability and economic health is important in terms of energy 
security, because no big power wants any disruption in the flow of oil or natural gas. So a 
transit country guarantees its own political stability by its pipelines.130 
From the liberal point of view, pipelines provide interdependence and 
positive sum economics, because the flow of oil and natural gas is important for the 
producer country, transit country and consumer country. So, pipelines have become a 
motivation for positive sum interdependence.131 
Energy-rich Eurasia is the main reason for pipeline wars.  The main 
problem about Eurasian pipelines is the how and where to build pipelines, because each 
pipeline project has run into major obstacles—political, military, economic, or a 
combination—so, the “million dollar question” is how and where to build the 
pipelines.132 
The Caspian has been the battle area of the twenty-first century’s “Great 
Game,” because countries that have strong interest in where pipelines run will get a great 
deal of political leverage. Thus, the U.S., Russia, and Turkey are trying to win this 
pipeline game.133 
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b.  East-West Corridor Strategy 
The Caspian Sea Basin possesses around 90 billion barrels of oil. This 
amount is slightly more than that of the North Sea and equal to reserves of Iran and 
Kuwait. The U.S. and EU import around 50 percent of their oil and Japan almost 100 
percent. Oil is a vital interest for the world’s developed countries.134 As the Eurasian 
countries are landlocked, the shortest routes to the world’s sea-lanes are by pipelines. The 
sea-lanes are in the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf is 
not an option due to U.S.’ isolation policies against Iran.135 Turkey is located between the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea and is, therefore, the vital player in this pipeline 
war.136 For that reason, the U.S. formalized a “strategic energy alliance” to promote 
energy diversity and security, develop Caspian sources, transport oil and gas through 
Turkey to international markets.137 
Turkey is an important actor in Eurasia, although it is not a Eurasian state. 
The expansion of U.S. commercial interests in Eurasia and Russia’s reduced influence 
has provided Turkey with the opportunity to project its influence in the region.138 
In 1993, when the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan 
was first suggested, Turkey’s potential role as a transit route between consumer and 
producer emerged.139 
The United States embraced the idea of an East-West energy corridor that 
transports energy from Eurasia to Europe while excluding Russia and Iran, also 
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increasing the independence of Eurasia and linking those countries with the West.140 The 
Clinton administration identified broad U.S. interests as rapid energy development and 
the construction of multiple pipelines in Eurasia.141 However, Russia has opposed the 
multiple pipeline strategy due to its strong desire to retain control over its “Near 
Abroad.”142 Among other regional powers, Turkey also embraced the idea of an East-
West corridor and multiple pipelines due to its geopolitical advantage.143  
The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan project is the main pillar of the U.S.- Turkish 
East-West corridor policy. It will not only benefit Ankara financially, but will also 
represent the symbolic aspiration of Turkey’s regional power.144 With the opening of the 
BTC pipeline, Turkey already has become the key transit country for energy. The BTC 
brings 1 million bbl/d of crude oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to Turkey’s port of 
Ceyhan from which it can be shipped by tanker to Europe.145 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE or South Caucasus) natural gas pipeline 
is another leg of the East-West corridor strategy of the U.S.  The BTE pipeline brings 8.8 
billion cubic meters per year of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan natural gas to Turkey.146 
(1) New Silk Road-Eurasia. Eurasia holds the world’s third largest 
hydrocarbon reserves after the Persian Gulf and Siberia.147 Its oil reserves have 16 
percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 53 percent of the proven natural gas 
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reserves.148 It is seen as the next Persian Gulf, an area of such enormous untapped energy 
sources that it may become an alternative to the Middle East. However, there is 
exaggeration. The energy deposits in the region will not “shake the world,” but are 
enough to diversify the energy sources of the world market.149 
However, most of the Eurasian states are landlocked and depend 
on other countries to transport oil and gas to world markets.150 Russia and Georgia are 
the only Eurasian countries that have seaways to the sea.151 Other Eurasian energy-rich 
states do not have outlets to the open sea, meaning that their oil and gas cannot be loaded 
directly into tankers.152 
The future of Caspian energy-rich states relies on export pipelines, 
because pipelines are the only way for landlocked Caspian states to develop their 
economies by shipping energy to global markets. If they want to improve their economies 
and reduce their dependence on Russia, then pipelines are a sine qua non.153 
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However, these states cannot get their energy to market without 
crossing other territory.154 So, regional cooperation is necessary for installation of 
pipelines in the region, too.155 
The so-called New Silk Road will be a pipeline corridor stretching 
from Central Asia to Turkey and to Western consumer markets.156 The New Silk Road is 
important, because Eurasian governments consider oil and gas as crucial for economic 
recovery and future prosperity. Besides Eurasian countries, OECD countries also 
consider the sources important from an energy security perspective.157 
The reason for the growing Turkish focus on Caspian energy 
development in the post-Cold War environment concerns pipelines construction projects. 
The transport of Caspian energy to Western markets has been a major source of 
international political and economic maneuvering and diplomacy. Producing countries, 
neighboring countries, Western oil companies and the U.S. have actively sought to 
influence choices concerning the routing of new pipelines. 158 
The efforts of the Eurasian states to circumvent Russia, when 
shipping oil and natural gas has resulted in the emergence of Turkey as a dominant player 
in the export of Caspian oil and natural gas.159 The BTC pipeline confirmed Turkey’s 
importance to Eurasia.  
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Turkey also sees the oil and gas pipelines as a source of stability, 
cooperation and good relations, which can prevent ethnic and religious conflicts in 
Eurasia. For that reason, Suleyman Demirel, ex-Turkish President, said: “We see this rich 
region of oil and gas reserves not just as a source of energy, but as an element of stability; 
just as the founders of the European community saw coal as a source of peace and 
stability for Europe.  So we see oil and gas in our region serving the same role.” Turkey 
knows the importance of forging trade and investments in Eurasia.160 
(2) Cooperation with the U.S.  U.S. Policymakers in the U.S. view 
Eurasia as a potential counterbalance to excessive dependence on the Middle East, 
especially Saudi Arabia. But even if oil and gas were not at stake, there are other key 
interests driving U.S. policy, especially the desire to break regional dependence on 
Russia, isolate Iran, and support Turkish ambitions in the region.161 
The construction of pipelines from Eurasia is imperative for the 
U.S.’ creation of an East-West transportation corridor. For that reason, the U.S. has 
supported multiple oil and gas pipelines, since the 1990s. This policy was underpinned by 
the Silk Road Strategy Act, which emphasizes the development of infrastructure along  
the east-west axis in order to build strong international relations and commerce between 
countries of Eurasia, as well as to support US business interests and investments in the 
region.162  
The European Union followed a similar strategy with the U.S. and 
manifested the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) project to fund 
the development of a transportation corridor from the Black Sea to Central Asia. The 
                                                 
160  Bulent Aras and George Foster, "Turkey: Looking for a Light at the End of the Caspian Pipeline," 
in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, ed. Michael P. Croissant and Bulent Aras (Westport: 
Praeger, 1999), 229–230. 
161  Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, "Introduction: Energy, Conflict, and Development in the Caspian 
Sea Region," in Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon 
(New York: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2000), 32. 
162  Fiona Hill, "Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks," in The Future of Turkish 
Foreign Politics, ed. Lenore G., and Dimitris Keridis Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 219. 
 35
East-West corridor policy is viewed as a tool to reduce Russia’s control over the Eurasian 
states and bolster Turkey’s position as a bridge between  Eurasia and Europe.163   
U.S. policy is interested in the construction of at least one major 
east-west energy export route that will be insulated from Russian interference and that 
will deny Iran the lucrative transportation tariffs associated with such a pipeline.164 
Turkey has the central location for these two similar policies. 
Turkey is the member of OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Customs Union with 
the European Union. It is also a leading country in the Muslim world. In addition, Turkey 
has linguistic, ethnic, cultural and historic ties with the Eurasian countries. Furthermore, 
its location is in the middle of Eurasia and Europe. All these factors place Turkey in a 
unique position as a potential transit state.165 
Development of Eurasian oil and gas pipelines and making Turkey 
an energy hub, the maintenance of de facto independence for Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics, are the convergence of U.S. and Turkey’s 
foreign policy goals in terms of energy.166 
Turkey possesses, however, only very limited economic means of 
its own to bring about realization of its interests. The success of its Eurasian energy 
policy mainly depends on the U.S. government’s policies.167 Therefore, Turkey does not  
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want to antagonize the US in Eurasia. Both countries, the U.S. and Turkey, have been 
working for a Eurasian transit corridor to export oil and natural gas resources from the 
Caspian region to Europe.168 
(3) Competition with Russia. Russia and Turkey are natural rivals 
in Eurasia. Russia views Turkey as the main beneficiary of the Soviet collapse and 
pursues a Near Abroad policy, which assumed that former Soviet Republics belong to a 
Russian sphere of influence. According to Russia, Turkey is a Trojan horse of the U.S. 
and the West. Turkey is seen by Russia as the main challenger after the U.S. in the 
Eurasia region.169 
Turkey’s Eurasian policy differs from Russia’s. It mainly seeks to 
decrease the newly independent states’ dependence on Russia, and become a major actor 
in the region to secure economic and security benefits.170 Thus, Turkey and Russia have 
clashed on three different points in terms of their different visions: the BTC and 
Nabucco, Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits, separatist Chechens and the terrorist PKK. 
In line with this policy, Turkey has sought to transport Eurasian 
crude oil through the BTC by blocking Russia’s Baku-Novorossiysk option. To support 
this argument, Turkey argued that straits are narrow and there are frequent collisions and 
accidents with oil tankers, which can cause an environmental disaster. So Turkey adopted 
new regulations concerning straits on July 1, 1994. Russia argued that Turkey violated 
the Montreux Convention that regulated the control of Turkish Straits.171  
Russia also accused Turkey of supporting Chechens through 
clandestine activities in the 1990s. In addition, Turkey accused Russia of aiding and 
providing refuge for PKK members. Both countries used their weaknesses to weaken 
each other.172 However, Turkey succeeded first with construction of the BTC pipeline. 
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Now, Russia and Turkey are again rivals on the Nabucco project, although they are 
approaching each other much more moderately than before. 
c.  East-West Corridor With the Middle East 
Oil is an important energy source for Turkey, but oil slowly gives way to 
natural gas as the energy choice in Turkey, because it is less polluting, more readily 
available to Turkey, and cheaper than oil. In addition, Turkey’s geopolitical location 
provides abundant natural gas import ways from Middle East, Eurasia and Russia. For 
that reason Turkey is trying to diversify its natural gas supplies by increasing geopolitical 
ties with the Middle East. 173 
(1) Cooperation with Iran. Economic factors, especially those 
related to energy, increasingly tie the two countries together.174 
Turkey signed an agreement with Iran to meet its growing demand 
for natural gas in 1996. Turkey and Iraq agreed to a $23 billion natural gas deal. It would 
deliver 4 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Turkey annually. After completion of the 
pipeline, it would increase to 10 bcm annually.175 
Turkey and Iran have signed a memorandum for developing 
Iranian gas and oil for the Turkish market as well as for onward export via pipeline to 
Europe. Even though the U.S. disapproves of this agreement due to the Iran Sanctions 
Act of the United States, Ankara signed the agreement. This agreement has major 
implications for the geostrategic “pipeline war” among the U.S., Russia, Iran, and 
Turkey.176 By creating this pipeline, Turkey hopes to tie Iran the East West corridor to 
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Europe. In this way, Turkey is diversifying its natural gas resources and also stepping 
forward to become an energy hub in the region. 
In addition to the bilateral agreement with Iran, Turkey also 
concluded an agreement with Turkmenistan for natural gas exports through Iran’s soil for 
which Iran will receive transit fees.177 
This process deepened with the signing in mid-September 2007 of 
a memorandum of understanding between the Iran and Turkey for an extensive joint 
venture in this area. Turkey has now become a major hub for the consumption of Iranian 
gas and oil, as well as for this onward transport to the West. Despite strong opposition, 
the EU will welcome this Iranian alternative to exclusive reliance on Russian exports to 
Europe—also not favored by Washington.178 
With respect to their mutual economic interests, Turkey and Iran 
are also potential competitors for alternative oil and gas transit pipelines from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.179 
(2) Iraq Option. The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline closed in 1991 
and reopened in 2004 after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Before the first Gulf War, it was 
the most important oil source for Turkey. Now Turkey is expecting the Kirkuk-
Yumurtalik oil pipeline to reach its old capacity even though there have been many 
incidents of sabotage by insurgents.180 If the pipeline reaches its old capacity, it will be 
another important source of oil for Turkey. 
Turkey has also expressed an interest in  developing Iraq’s natural 
gas fields. Iraq has the eleventh largest natural gas reserves in the world with 3.17 trillion 
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cubic meters.181 So, constructing a pipeline, parallel to the existing twin oil pipelines to 
Ceyhan, will be relatively low-cost and a short-time option.182 Within this framework, a 
memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkey and Iraq on August 7, 2007 
in Ankara in order to supply Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and via Turkey to Europe.183 In 
this way, Turkey expects to add Iraq to the East-West energy corridor. 
d.  North-South Corridor 
(1) Cooperation with Russia. After a period of competition, Russia 
and Turkey recognized that their rivalry was unlikely to produce a victory in Eurasia, and 
that it undermined their national security and their relations with Western powers. Russia 
became aware that it was not a superpower anymore, but a regional power. Turkey 
accepted that its capacity to project power over Eurasia was very limited due to lack of 
economic and political resources. Thus, economic and political limitations pushed both 
countries to rapprochement.184 
In 1997, Turkey and Russia started to cooperate. Turkey signed a 
natural gas agreement with Russia called the Blue Stream pipeline, which was 
constructed under the Black Sea and delivered 16 bcm of natural gas by the year 2010.185 
So, Turkey is a partner in the delivery of Russian gas. 
Russia and Turkey have mixed relations in terms of energy. On the 
one hand, rivalry and mistrust between Turkey and Russia on Eurasia constitute a 
potential source of instability. On the other hand, unprecedented growth of economic ties 
has created considerable Turkish-Russian interdependence, and the determination of both 
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sides to expand those ties offers an enormous opportunity for achieving mutual trust. 
Turkish-Russian relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century thus should be 
defined as “virtual rapprochement”—neither adversity nor friendship, but a mixture of 
the two that both sides find challenging to manage.186 Turkey and Russia are competitors 
with regard to the transportation of Eurasian oil and gas; but they are also partners 
concerning the natural gas of Russia.187 
Thus, the Turkish-Russian relationship now rests on quite new 
foundations; powerful ties are emerging, and most contentious issues of the past are 
fading. Some elements of rivalry will always exist for influence in the Muslim regions of 
the former Soviet Union, and over alternative courses of east-west energy pipelines to 
Europe (whether they should traverse Russia or Turkey), but these issues seem 
manageable, especially to the degree that Russia now views Turkey as an independent 
competitor to Moscow and no longer an instrument of U.S. policies. Russia is expected to 
consistently encourage this independence.188 
Both domestic sources of Turkish and Russian foreign policy 
behavior and the states’ changing positions in the international system influence their 
foreign policy actions in the Eurasian region. For this reason, relations between Russia 
and Turkey displayed different characteristics before and after 1997. In 1992-1997, 
relations were characterized by a geopolitical rivalry between the two regional powers; 
since 1997, both states have moved to normalize their relations as their positions toward 
the West also started to converge.189 
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(2) Russia-Israel-Turkey. Considerably, huge Turkish import of 
Russian natural gas – which comprises at least 65 percent of Turkish gas imports190 – 
through the Blue Stream pipeline under the Black Sea builds massive interdependence 
between the two countries. Actually, Russia wants to expand the Blue Stream gas 
pipeline from Turkey to Israel. Furthermore, Russia and Turkey agree on a pipeline, 
which is called Samsun-Kirikkale-Ceyhan pipeline that would cost an estimated $1 
billion, to carry Russian oil south across Turkey to the Aegean. Another alternative is the 
trans-Thrace pipeline, in which Russian oil  will go through Turkish soil from the Black 
Sea into the Mediterranean—instead of through the sensitive and already overcrowded 
Bosphorus.191 
In 2007, Turkey and Israel agreed on constructing a pipeline 
system, which connects the Black Sea to the Red Sea. This pipeline would bypass Syria 
and Lebanon and bring both gas and oil from Russia and Azerbaijan through Turkey to 
Israel by going underwater. Israel is still interested in Turkey’s capability to transport 
energy from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Israel. BTC oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to 
Turkey is the first step of this aim.192 
(3) Arab Natural Gas Project. Even though Egypt and Turkey have 
never had a cordial relationship, in 1996, Turkey opened negotiations with Egypt over the 
possible provision of Egyptian natural gas to Turkey. Full construction and operation of 
the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline to carry Egyptian gas to Turkey, via Jordan and Syria, was 
scheduled for 2009,193 but the project has yet to materialize and its economic feasibility 
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still remains a question.194 Anyway, the Arab Natural Gas pipeline is seen as an 
important route in the future for the South-North energy corridor.195 
D.  CONCLUSION 
Turkey cannot realize its goals concerning the Caspian by relying on its own 
resources and capabilities. Ankara has to develop a long-term policy that is coordinated 
with the political interests of its American and, to a lesser extent, European allies. In 
following its oil and natural gas pipeline interests, Ankara has to take into consideration 
U.S. policy objectives. As a consequence, to reap the fruits of its pipeline plans, Turkey 
has to design a policy that will keep American support for the East-West energy corridor 
plans without overly antagonizing Russia and Iran. This asks for skillful energy 
diplomacy. In such a plan, Turkey can be an important catalyst, especially if it can secure 
the long-term support of its western allies.196 
Turkey is described as an “energy hub” or “energy corridor” in the East-West 
direction. However, Turkey’s policy is to become not only an East-West energy corridor, 
but also a North-South energy corridor.197 For that strategy, Turkey has been exploiting 
the foreign policies of regional powers. Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy, in terms of 
energy, is a delicate balancing policy between regional rivals. In this way, Turkey is 
endeavoring to become an energy hub in the axis of East-West as well as North-South 
and South-North. 
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III.  WHY TURKEY? 
Turkey’s main aim is to realize becoming an energy hub between energy rich and 
energy poor regions. However, Turkey needs to prove itself as an energy hub to the 
energy rich and energy hungry countries. Turkey has several advantages. If Turkey 
exploits its advantages in proper ways, Turkey can persuade the energy related countries 
to choose Turkey as an energy hub. 
The first of its advantages is Turkey’s location. Turkey is in the middle of energy 
consumer Europe and energy rich Eurasia, Middle East and Russia. Furthermore, Turkey 
is surrounded by three seas, which are connected to each other by the straits. These seas 
are the main outlets of Russia, Eurasia and the Middle East in terms of energy. So, 
Turkey is in the middle of the passages from east to west. 
Turkey’s second important advantage is the overlapping energy strategies of the 
European Union and Turkey. These two are heavily dependent on Russia’s natural gas 
and oil. Both of them, Turkey and Europe, are needed to diversify their energy suppliers. 
Turkey is between the Eurasia and the Middle East and Europe. So Turkey can diversify 
its energy suppliers with Eurasia and the Middle East as well as Europe by becoming a 
transit country to Europe from Eurasia and the Middle East.  
The third advantage of Turkey is the international pipelines, which go through 
Turkey to Europe and the other regions. Turkey is already an energy transit country by its 
existing, planned and under construction pipelines. Turkey has pipelines from all of the 
energy rich countries and regions to energy consumer countries and regions. Thus, 
Turkey has  already established itself as an energy hub. 
Turkey’s fourth advantage is reliability. Turkey is a member of several western 
institutions such as NATO, OECD and the Customs Union with the European Union. For 
that reason, Turkey has common interests with these countries and shares democracy 
with the western regimes.. In addition, Turkey’s “zero problem with the neighbors” 
strategy promotes Turkey to other reliable countries in terms of energy security.   
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Last of the advantages is Turkey’s infrastructure in its energy industry. Turkey 
has large capacity refineries, underground natural gas storage, an indigenous natural gas 
and oil pipeline network and the Ceyhan terminal as an international energy terminal. All 
these infrastructures contribute to Turkey’s goals.  
If Turkey exploits all of its advantages, it can sanctify itself as an energy hub for 
the energy-related countries. Therefore, Turkey can meet its own energy demands by 
constructing an energy network, of which Turkey will be at the center. 
A.  NATURAL BRIDGE 
1.  Location 
In terms of energy security, transportation of hydrocarbon energy sources is one 
of the most important issues. There should be secure, reliable, fast and inexpensive 
transportation routes for hydrocarbon sources such as oil and natural gas. In this regard, 
Turkey’s geographic location makes it a natural bridge. On the east side of Turkey, there 
are the energy rich Middle East, Caspian Basin; on the North side there is oil and natural 
gas rich Russia; and on the west side, there is energy consuming Europe.198 
The Caspian Basin, the Middle East and Russia have 70 percent of the world’s 
total proven oil and gas resources, and Europe is the second largest energy consumer in 
the world. Turkey, therefore, is in the middle of the energy rich and energy hungry 
regions and countries.199  
Turkey’s location has an important place in Turkey’s energy policy. Turkey 
usually exploits its location when describing its energy strategy. Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan pointed out the importance of Turkey’s location within the country’s 
energy policy by these words: “One of the main factors of Turkey’s energy strategy is 
making use of its geography and geostrategic location by creating a corridor between 
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countries with energy resources and energy consuming countries.”200 Turkey sees itself 
as a natural energy hub between the east- west and recently north-south and south-north 
axis.201 
2.  Seas and Straits 
Turkey’s location is related not only to being in the middle of energy consumer 
and energy rich countries, but also having straits as passages of oil transportation as well 
as sitting on major international waterways.202 
Turkey is surrounded by the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean 
Sea on three sides. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelle Straits are the connection between 
these three seas. Furthermore, these three seas are important for oil transportation. Turkey 
commands the straits, which are the only maritime connections between these seas, and 
are the main outlet for Russian, and Caspian Basin’s oil to Europe and the world. In this 
regard, Turkey looks like a gatekeeper while the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits appear 
as a gate to Europe in terms of energy transportation.  
Across the 17-mile Bosphorus Straits, approximately 3 million barrels per day 
passes from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. From the Mediterranean Sea, oil 
usually goes west and south. The Straits are one of the busiest waterways in the world. In 
a year, 50,000 vessels, including 5,500 oil tankers, pass through the Straits.203 Even 
though, according to the 1936 Montreux Convention, all commercial vessels are 
guaranteed free passage through the Straits, Turkey issued some restrictive regulations on 
passage rules to prevent any accidents in this most difficult waterway. 204 
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Since the Montreux Convention was signed in 1936, the traffic density has 
increased significantly in the straits. In 1936, the average number of vessels passing 
through the straits was about 4,500. Now this number is over 50,000. Moreover, the 
number of tankers has increased significantly (see Figure 6).205 In terms of transportation 
through the straits, Turkey’s importance is huge. 
 
Figure 6.   Number of Tankers Navigating Through the Bosphorus Strait206 
B.  ENERGY SECURITY OF TURKEY AND EUROPE 
Europe is one of the most developed places in the world. It is big, has been quite 
dynamic, and unlike some other actual or potential markets, it is not ridden by payment 
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and currency instability problems.207 There are many welfare states within Europe. 
Therefore, its industry provides one of the most modern and reliable markets in the 
world. However, Europe needs energy to maintain its development at the same ratio. Oil 
and natural gas have the biggest share in Europe’s energy portion. Unfortunately, Europe 
does not have enough oil and natural gas resources indigenously. Thus, it needs to import 
oil and natural gas from outside. However, while Europe imports natural gas and oil, 
energy security appears as a big problem.  
As time passes, Europe’s oil and natural gas reserves are decreasing.208 Almost 
half of Europe’s requirement is met by Europe’s indigenous reserves, currently. 
However, the remainder, half of Europe’s requirement, is imported. Oil provides most of 
this imported energy. Europe’s required oil is met by Russia with 30 percent, by the 
Middle East with 20 percent, by North Africa with 12 percent, and by others with 23 
percent. Norway, which is the biggest oil exporter to Europe, supplies 16 percent, while 
the United Kingdom and Denmark supply only 25 percent of Europe’s requirement.209 
Other than oil, natural gas is the second imported commodity of energy in Europe. 
As time has passed, consumption of natural gas has increased in Europe and the world. 
Europe meets one third of its requirement from the North Sea.; 45 percent of the 
remainder comes from Russia; 24 percent from Norway; 21 percent from Algeria; and 11 
percent from other countries.210  
According to estimates, by 2030, Europe’s oil import requirements will be 
increased by 20 percent and reach 730 million tonnes of equivalent (Mtoe) compared to 
608 Mtoe in 2006. And, natural gas requirements will reach 625 bcm or 65 percent of EU 
demand. Russia will continue to be the main supplier of oil and natural gas through 2030. 
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Other producers need to increase their exports to Europe. 211 Already, the EU imports 50 
percent of its energy and that is expected to reach 70 percent in 2020.212 So, Europe will 
have to import almost 90 percent of its energy needs in 2030.213 
A picture of Europe’s energy problem shows that within several years Europe will 
face an important energy problem. For that reason, Europe has taken some steps. One is 
to design an energy policy. Europe has based its energy policy on three main pillars: 
sustainability, competitiveness (open energy market), and security of supply.214 To face 
the problem of lack of energy supplies, Europe is seeking to diversify the sources and 
routes of energy to prevent any disruption.215 In this situation, Europe is attempting to 
maintain sustainability of the flow of oil and natural gas rather than its rate of dependence 
on oil and natural gas imports. In parallel, Europe’s main concern is the use of the flow of 
oil and natural gas as a political weapon by the energy supplier countries. Most energy 
supplier countries are subject to terrorism, civil strife, ethnic tensions and controlling the 
energy industry by governments, which can use energy for the countries’ national 
goals.216 From this perspective, Russia, especially, appears as a main concern as the most 
important oil and gas supplier for Europe.217  
The Russia-Ukraine natural gas crisis in 2006, the Russia-Belarus natural gas 
crisis in 2007, and the last Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2009 have demonstrated the 
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importance of energy security for Europe.218 Europe is seeking an alternative for Russia 
as its main energy supplier.219 For that reason, Europe’s energy policy has two main 
goals: first circumventing Russia and also reducing the EU’s already high dependence on 
Russia.220 
Turkey’s situation is similar to that of Europe. Turkey is dependent on the outside 
for oil and natural gas resources. Turkey does not have significant oil and natural gas 
reserves. Almost 90 percent of its oil comes from the outside of Turkey. Natural gas is 
becoming a more preferred energy source due to its less polluting nature and also to 
Turkey’s proximity to the huge gas reserves of the Caspian and Middle East.221 Also, 
natural gas is important for electricity production (about 65 percent), industry (19 
percent) and the residential sector (14 percent). Another important reason is that in 
approximately twenty years, Turkey’s natural gas and oil reserves will be completely 
depleted, according to estimates of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation.222 Thus, Turkey 
is attempting to build many pipelines to meet its huge and increasing energy demand.223 
In this context, Turkey’s energy security policy overlaps with the European 
Union’s. Turkey and Europe have common interests on energy security.224 In 2010, 
Turkey will import almost 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia, and Russia will 
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continue as the second biggest supplier of its oil. The Ukraine crises also affected Turkey. 
Turkey has no other opportunity for oil and gas, in case a political problem occurs 
between Turkey and Russia. Because of this, Turkey is also seeking to diversify its 
resources and has signed natural gas and oil agreements with other energy rich 
countries.225 Turkey imports almost 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia, 20 percent 
from Iran, 13 percent from Azerbaijan and the remainder from Algeria and Nigeria as a 
liquefied natural gas form.226 Besides, Turkey has negotiated with Qatar to build a 
natural gas pipeline to Turkey.227 
In this manner, the European Union has a key position for Turkey’s energy 
policy, because Turkey has established its policy as the transit route to Europe.228 Thus, 
Turkey will be able to secure its energy security and satisfy its energy needs. Turkey also 
has a key position for the European Union’s energy security, because Europe sees 
Eurasia, Russia and the Mediterranean countries as its main energy suppliers. Turkey is 
considered by Europe as a strategic partner in this manner.229 The European Union stated 
this in its Green Paper in 2000.230  
In this respect, Turkey is in the middle of the Europe’s energy game. Europe 
wants to build energy pipelines, which bring non-Russian oil and natural gas through 
Turkey. Furthermore, Eurasian newly independent states as energy producer countries are 
looking for new and reliable energy markets without “upsetting” Russia. If Turkey and 
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the EU cooperate in this respect, the EU will get a reliable alternative supply route, and 
Turkey will gain transit fees, meet its energy demands and secure its energy security.231 
Europe’s diversifying efforts provide Turkey with many opportunities to shape its 
own energy policies. Especially, energy crises between Russia and Ukraine have changed 
Europe’s view of Turkey, on a large scale, in terms of energy security.232 However, 
Turkey should import much more oil and natural gas from non-Russian countries, which 
Russia does not control politically and economically, if Turkey wants to guarantee its key 
position for the European Union’s energy security. For that reason, Turkey is assessing 
all opportunities other than Russia, such as Iraq, Egypt, Iran and Qatar.233 
C.  INTERNATIONAL PIPELINES BETWEEN TURKEY AND ITS 
NEIGHBORS 
Turkey could serve as distribution hub with regard to future pipeline projects,234 
because Turkey is consolidating the future network of pipelines by its agreements of 
today. Turkey has entered into oil and natural gas agreements with Russia, Israel, Egypt, 
Iraq, Qatar, Iran, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. Even though Turkey has 
only the BTC, BTE, TGI, Turkey-Iran and Blue Stream today as pipelines, agreements 
that Turkey has concluded depict that Turkey is forming the pipeline network of the 
future. Out of the five pipelines that Turkey has today, Turkey has concluded more 
agreements for pipelines with different energy rich countries. Perhaps this situation can 
be defined as Turkey already being an energy hub in its region (See Figure 7). Turkey has 
planned, has under construction and has in existence natural and oil pipelines in 
cooperation with Russia, Eurasia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Europe. 
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Figure 7.    Major Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines in Turkey235 
1.  Turkey-Russia 
a.  The Trans-Balkan Natural Gas Pipeline 
Russia is Turkey’s main natural gas supplier and holds almost 60 percent 
of Turkey’s total natural gas imports. Russia supplies Turkey by two separate natural gas 
pipelines. One of them is known as the Trans-Balkan Pipeline, which traverses Moldova, 
Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria.236 The Trans-Balkan Pipeline agreement was signed  
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with the Soviet Union in September 1984 and started first deliveries in 1987 to reduce the 
Turkish energy dependence on the Middle East.237 It delivers 27 percent of Turkey’s total 
natural gas requirements.238 
b.  The Blue Stream I and II Natural Gas Pipelines 
The Blue Stream is the second natural gas pipeline, which supplies Turkey 
with Russian natural gas. It is the result of a 25-year agreement by the Russian and 
Turkish sides.239 Its cost was around $3.2 billion and supplies 31 percent of Turkey’s 
total natural gas requirement. The construction was completed in 2002 and oil started to 
flow in 2003.240 It is a twin pipeline coming from Dzhugba in Russia to the Turkish city 
of Samsun and lies under the Black Sea.241  
Blue Stream, the world’s deepest underwater pipeline, is important for 
Turkey and Russia for several reasons. First, it is a direct link to Russia from Turkey. So 
Turkey has prevented disruptions such as those, which occurred in Romania, Moldova, 
Ukraine and Bulgaria where those countries host the Trans-Balkan natural gas 
pipeline.242  
Second, Blue Stream creates a long-term interdependence between Russia 
and Turkey and it is the most important leg of the north-south energy corridor from 
Russia to Israel.243 Turkey and Russia have ambitions to extend the flow of Russian 
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natural gas through Turkey to Israel. It is an important sign for these two countries, after 
competition on the Caspian in the east-west energy corridor, to cooperation on the north-
south energy corridor in the post-Cold War period.244 
Third, and the last is a criticism, Turkey’s dependence on Russia has 
increased by the Blue Stream pipeline since Turkey is trying to diversify its energy 
sources. The use of this pipeline looks like a contrast in Turkey’s energy policy. Now, 
Turkey imports almost 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Hence, Turkish analysts 
criticize the Blue Stream due to increasing the dependence rather than diversification.245 
It is criticized, not only by Turkish analysts, but also by the United States due to also 
potentially making Europe more dependent on Russia for energy.246 
Russia and Turkey have also started to meet on the proposed Blue Stream 
2 natural gas pipeline as an extension of the north-south energy corridor. The project’s 
aim is to carry Russian natural gas through the Black Sea and Turkey for distribution to 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus.247 In short, Blue Stream pipelines are the sign of the 
strong relationship between Turkey and Russia in terms of energy. 
c.  South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline 
The South Stream Pipeline is not mainly between Turkey and Russia. The 
South Stream goes from Russia to Italy via Bulgaria under the Black Sea. Although it 
does not use Turkish territory, it traverses the Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
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which is territorial water of Turkey in the Black Sea. It is designed to bypass Ukraine248 
and carry  Russian gas to the Southern Europe.249 
The importance of the South Stream is mainly geostrategic. It is a direct 
rival for Europe’s Nabucco project.250 Nabucco is designed to circumvent Russia and is 
backed by the United States and Turkey. However, Turkey also signed the agreement for 
the South Stream. By this agreement, Turkey is exploiting its geostrategic position. 
Whichever pipeline is constructed, Turkey will be lucky. It will gain not only transit fees 
and energy related business but Turkey will also be guaranteed its major energy hub 
role.251  
Even though the South Stream has detrimental effects on the European 
energy diversification project, it also plays a role in that diversification project. Russia 
has the capacity of providing enough natural gas for Europe. If it can construct the South 
Stream and if the Europe can construct the Nabucco pipeline, both of them together will 
provide a diversification role for Europe. Consequently, Europe will gain natural gas 
from both South Stream and Nabucco.  
d. Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass Oil Pipeline 
The proposed Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass oil pipeline is very important for 
both Russia and Turkey because of the Turkish Straits. The Turkish Straits are very 
important oil passages as well as important choke points in terms of increased oil 
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transportation.  Almost 3.7 percent of the world’s daily oil consumption is shipped 
through the Turkish Straits most of which belongs to Russia. According to Turkish 
officials, the amount of oil and oil product shipments increased from 60 million tonnes in 
1996 to 150 million tonnes in 2007 and is anticipated to reach at least to 190 million 
tonnes in the near future.252  
However, the Turkish Straits are almost 17 miles (30 kilometers) in length 
and 3 miles (4.7 kilometers) wide (maximum width). The narrowest width is only 698 
meters not even a half-mile.253 Thus, Turkey is looking for alternative options for the 
Turkish Straits due to the Straits’ role as a choke point as well as its role as an important 
passage in terms of energy transportation.254  
The Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass oil pipeline is an important alternative 
project proposed to carry oil while bypassing the sensitive and already overcrowded 
Straits.255 Initial approval was given in 2006 by Turkey’s Council of Ministers in 2006 
and was launched in 2007, due to be completed in 2011.256 This oil pipeline is planned to 
be 350-miles and cost 1 billion dollars.257 Its main supplier will be the Kashagan oil field 
in Kazakhstan’s portion of the Caspian Sea.258 Furthermore, Turkey persuaded Russia to 
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supply the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline with its oil supplies.259 Even though the 
overcrowded Bosphorus will remain a major passage and chokepoint in terms of energy 
transportation, the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline will ease the burden on the Bosphorus 
Straits260 and protect Istanbul from potentially destructive oil spills that could be 
disastrous for Istanbul’s environment and population.261 
2.  Turkey-Eurasia 
a.  Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline 
The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is the world’s second longest 
pipeline, 1768 kilometers, with the capacity of 50 million tonnes of oil per year.262 It was 
officially completed in 2006 and traverses Baku in Azerbaijan, Tblisi in Georgia and 
Ceyhan in Turkey. Its capacity has increased from 1 million barrels per day to 1.2 million 
barrels per day.263 It meets almost 1.5 percent of the world’s oil supply.264 
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is the most important leg of the United 
States and Turkey’s East-West energy corridor policy,265 because it carries Caspian crude 
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oil by bypassing two major regional powers, Russia and Iran.266 It is the very first direct 
pipeline to deliver crude oil from Eurasia to the Mediterranean bypassing Russia.267 
From the perspective of the West, it is the central part of the East-West 
corridor linking the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe for integration to the West.268 
The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline is also seen as an important element to ensure the 
independence and economic viability of the former Soviet states of Eurasia, which are 
highly dependent on Russia. The United States and Europe aim to ease the Russian 
influence on the Caspian States by the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, because it bypasses 
Russia and Iran, which are the main competitors against the United States and Europe in 
Eurasia.269  
This pipeline is not only seen as a source of independence of Eurasian 
States from Russia, but also as an important element to ease Europe’s dependence on 
Russia and the Middle East in terms of oil as an energy source.270 
From the perspective of Russia, it is the main obstacle for Russia’s 
monopolist energy policy.271 Moscow sees the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline as an 
instrument used by the West to erode Russian influence on its near abroad. Furthermore, 
the high cost of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline compared to other projects planned to 
carry Eurasian oil to the West has convinced Russia that the West is following an anti 
                                                 
266  Mehmet Ogutcu and Danilla Bochkarev, "Rivals Become Partners," European Voice, September 
21, 2009, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/09/rivals-become-partners- /65924.aspx.  
267  Langdon D. Clough, "Energy Profile of Turkey," The Encyclopedia of Earth, July 10, 2007, 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Turkey. 
268  Selma Stern, "Turkey’s Energy and Foreign Policy," Globalization, 2003, 
http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v3.1/03_stern.html. 
269  Soner Cagatay and Nazli Gencsoy, "Improving Turkish-Russian Relations: Turkey’s New Foreign 
Policy and Its Implications for the United States," The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, January 
12, 2005, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/policy_2005/2005_942/. 
270  Gokhan Bacik, "Turkey and Pipeline Politics," Turkish Studies 7, no. 2 (June 2006), 301.  
271  Jeffrey Mankoff, "Eurasian Energy Security," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2009, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18418/eurasian_energy_security.html, 19. 
 59
Russian policy in Eurasia in terms of energy. Thus, Russia appears angry about the Baku-
Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline since it reduces Russian influence on the Caspian.272 
From Turkey’s perspective, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline is an 
important source of benefits. Turkey earns between $140 and $200 million per year in 
transit fees273 and it is an important source of oil for Turkey’s energy hungry industry. 
Strategically, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline is the most important leg for Turkey’s 
policy of becoming an energy hub between the West and East.274 It binds Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia and allows Turkey to reach Central Asia.275 Furthermore, 
Turkey sees the BTC as an essential part of easing the burden on and bypassing the 
Straits.276  
So, Turkey will emerge as an energy hub while decreasing risk in the 
Straits and will strengthen links between the East and West through Turkey. This will 
provide Turkey huge leverage in Europe and Eurasia, and also increase the influence of 
Turkey on Eurasian Turkic energy rich countries. 
b.  South Caucasus (SCP) or Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural 
Gas Pipeline 
Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a natural gas agreement for bringing 
Azerbaijan’s natural gas to Turkey by a pipeline following the same route as the BTC on  
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March 12, 2001.277 The construction started in 2004. The pipeline officially is called the 
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), but is also known as the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum Natural 
Gas Pipeline.278  
Its cost is about 1.4 billion dollars.  It is about 690 kilometers in length 
and has a capacity of 8.1 billion cubic meters in a year.279 It became operational in July 
2007, and brings natural gas to Turkey through Georgia from Azerbaijan.280 Even though 
it was expected to bring about 6.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey, in 2008 it 
carried 7.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey. Moreover, it has the potential to 
expand its capacity from 8.1 billion cubic meters up to 22 billion cubic meters per year 
by adding compressor stations.281  
It is the second most important leg of the East-West energy corridor policy 
of the United States and Turkey. It is seen as the leg of natural gas for the East-West 
energy corridor policy.282 The major goal of this pipeline is to ship Caspian gas to 
Europe via Turkey 283 For Turkey, it connects the energy routes of Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey to Europe, so it provides Turkey with a new East-West belt. With this project, 
the Nabucco natural gas pipeline and the Turkey-Greece Interconnector pipelines, 
Turkey’s energy corridor will stretch from East to West, and Turkey will become an 
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energy hub.284 It is also worth noting that the BTE is considered as the first leg of the 
Trans-Caspian Natural Gas pipeline project, which would carry Turkmenistan’s natural 
gas to Europe underneath the Caspian Sea and via Turkey.285 
c.  Trans-Caspian (Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe) Natural Gas 
Pipeline Project 
Turkey and Turkmenistan signed an agreement for carrying 
Turkmenistan's natural gas to Europe via Turkey. It is projected to circumvent Russia and 
Iran by building a pipeline carrying Turkmen gas under the Caspian Sea through 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey.286 
According to the agreement, Turkmenistan would supply Turkey with 30 
billion cubic meters of natural gas of which Turkey would use 16 billion cubic meters 
and transship the remainder to Europe.287 
However, the Trans-Caspian pipeline project has been cancelled for three 
reasons. First of all, building the Trans-Caspian under the Caspian Sea Basin would 
extremely expensive, around $5-$8 billion.. Second, the legal status of the Caspian is 
uncertain. The last reason is ex-Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov’s character and 
unreliable personality.288 
Now, the situation has changed. Europe, the United States and Turkey are 
again thinking about building the Trans-Caspian pipeline due to Russian’s aggressive 
energy policy. But, now there is some debate over the route. At first it was thought to be 
from Turkmenistan due to the proximity of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. It would be 
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only a 47 mile-pipeline but under the Caspian Sea.289 Now, the pipeline can be directly 
brought from Kazakhstan, because the Kazakh portion of the Caspian Sea is shallower, 
about 30 feet compared to the 1600 feet of Turkmenistan portion of the Caspian Sea.290 
However, Turkmenistan is not waiting for Europe and the U.S.’s decision 
and is beginning construction. It has made an agreement with Iran to export its natural 
gas to Turkey. Because of Russia’s ceasing to purchase Turkmen gas, Turkmenistan 
needs to find a new market in which to  sell its natural gas, an important source of income 
for Turkmenistan. For that reason, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey expect to transport 
Turkmen gas to Turkey via Iran. It is also important to stress that Turkey is considering 
the re-sale the Turkmen natural gas to Europe.291  
3.  Turkey-Iran Natural Gas Pipeline 
Turkey and Iran signed a $20 billion, 25-year agreement on building natural gas 
pipelines from Iran in 1996. is the pipeline is  completed and started gas deliveries to 
Turkey from Iran in 2001, despite the United States’ objection.292 Its route is from Tebriz 
in Iran to Erzurum in Turkey. Turkey receives 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per 
year from Iran through this pipeline.293 
There are several reasons for Turkey to have chosen Iran as a natural gas supplier 
in spite of the United States’ objections. First, Iran can satisfy Turkey’s huge gap 
between its energy demand and supply by its natural gas sources. Second, Iran is 
geographically close to Turkey. To build a pipeline between Turkey and Iran is relatively 
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easy and would be close to the energy rich areas of Central Asia and the Middle East. So, 
the Iran route is suitable for Turkey to diversify its energy sources beyond Russia. Third, 
Iran has the second largest natural gas supply in the world. Turkey can use this in favor of 
its energy policy of becoming an energy hub between Europe and the East. Iran has 
enough gas to become and alternative supply for Europe.294 
Another reason for Turkey is Turkmenistan. Iran is the most logical and 
economical route to carry Turkmen natural gas to Turkey. Iran is a neighbor of 
Turkmenistan and Turkey. It has the significant pipeline network within. In comparison 
to the cost of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, the Iran route is cheaper to build to carry 
Turkmen gas to Turkey and later to Europe.295 Furthermore, Iran and Greece signed a 
memorandum for cooperation in natural gas transportation in March 2002. Turkey can re-
sell excess Iranian natural gas to Greece and transport it by the Turkey-Greece 
interconnector natural gas pipeline.296 All of these reasons caused Turkey to approach 
Iran as a natural gas supplier country despite the Iran Sanctions Act of the United States, 
which opposes any investment in Iran exceeding $20 million dollars.297 
4.  Turkey-Middle East 
a.  Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline 
The Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline was Turkey’s very first oil pipeline. It 
is a 600-mile pipeline connecting Turkey and Iraq. There are two parallel pipelines, 
which have a united capacity of 1.6 million barrels a day.298   
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Turkey changed its policy towards the Middle East from exclusive to more 
inward after the oil crisis of 1973, because cheap oil was no longer available. Turkey had 
to negotiate with Middle Eastern countries. Iraq was the best option for Turkey. Turkey 
negotiated with Iraq to build a crude oil pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Ceyhan 
Terminal in Turkey.299 The first tanker loaded its crude oil from Ceyhan in 1977. Turkey 
and Iraq agreed on the expansion of this pipeline by a second crude oil pipeline parallel to 
old one. In 1983, construction started and was completed in 1984. Thus, the annual 
capacity of the pipelines reached 70.9 million tonnes of oil or 1.6 million barrel per 
year.300  
In this way, Iraq was the major exporter of crude oil to Turkey until 
1991.301  
However, the first Gulf War changed the situation completely .The Iraq-
Ceyhan pipeline was closed due to United Nations’ sanctions on Iraq. For that reason, 
Turkey lost important revenues of up to $1.2 billion per year.302 In 1996, the Iraq-Turkey 
pipeline reopened under the UN resolutions of oil for food. After Saddam’s fall in 2003, 
new negotiations resulted in the transport of oil through the pipeline as before the first 
Gulf War, but it has never reached the amount of pre 1991 levels. In 2009, 167,600 
barrels of oil were transported.303 Negotiations to reach the before first Gulf level are 
ongoing.  
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b.  Iraq-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline 
According to the CIA World Factbook, Iraq has the world’s eleventh 
largest natural gas reserves, but its production is not efficient. For that reason, Iraq is not 
now exporting natural gas.304  
Turkey has been interested in Iraq’s untapped natural gas reserves since 
the 1990s. Turkey began negotiations with Iraq on natural gas reserves in 1996. The 
Turkey’s main goal was to import Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and then re-sell it to the 
other markets. According to a proposed agreement, Turkey would import 10 billion cubic 
meters per year by a pipeline parallel to the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline.305  However, 
the UN did not lift its sanctions so Turkey could not implement its plans in Iraq until the 
fall of Saddam Hussein.  
After the fall of Saddam Hussein and along with the increasing gas 
demands of Europe, Turkey restarted its negotiations with Iraq to develop its natural gas 
reserves. Consequently, Turkey and Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
August 7, 2007, in order to supply Iraqi natural gas to Turkey and via Turkey to 
Europe.306  
c.  Arab-Natural Gas Pipeline 
Turkey’s energy policy has the goal of becoming an energy hub not only 
on the axis of west and east, but also on the axis of south and north. As a result of this 
policy, Turkey would like to transport Egyptian natural gas to Europe through Turkish 
soil by a pipeline. For that reason, Turkey opened negotiations with Egypt in 1996.307  
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However, a plan was not implemented until 2004. In 2004, Turkey and 
Egypt signed a preliminary agreement on importing Egypt natural gas to Turkey. In 2006, 
a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. According to the agreement, Egypt would 
export 2-4 billion cubic meters of natural gas Turkey and 2-6 billion cubic meters of 
natural gas to Europe via Turkey.308 
The first delivery of natural gas was expected in 2009,309, but the plan has 
not been in operation yet. Egyptian natural gas is expected to be delivered in the future 
and to be an important component of the south-north energy corridor and of Turkey to 
meet its own increasing natural gas demand. 
d.  Turkey-Israel Pipeline 
Turkey has ambitions for Israel in regard to the south-north axis in terms 
of energy. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed to Israel building a pipeline, 
which would carry oil from the Ceyhan oil terminal to Haifa through Cyprus, in May 
2005. He proposed not only an oil pipeline but also pipelines to transport water, gas, 
electricity, and even fiber-optic cables.310 
Turkey also officially agreed with Israel on building a pipeline system 
linking the Black Sea – mainly for Russian oil and gas – to the Red Sea, so Israel will be 
converted into a hub that transports Russian and Eurasian gas and oil to Asia.311 Turkey 
and Israel agreed on this pipeline system in 2007. In this regard, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline, which ends in Ceyhan, near Israel, is seen as a first step.312 
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5.  Turkey-Europe  
a.  Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline 
The Nabucco natural gas pipeline is projected to transport Caspian and 
Middle Eastern natural gas via Turkey to Europe.313 Its length and capacity will be 
exactly 3282 kilometers and 25.5-31.0 billion cubic meters.314 The main goal of the 
pipeline is to increase the European Union’s energy security by diversifying its supplies 
from and reliance on Russia.315 
Europe’s dependence on natural gas is expected rise 80 percent by 2030. 
Today, Europe can meet only 42 percent of its natural gas demands by its indigenous 
production. The remainder is imported from Russia, Norway, and Algeria, along with a 
small amount from other sources.316 
However, due to a natural gas cutoff, because of the Russian-Belarus crisis 
in 2007, caused more than 80 percent of natural gas from Russia to Europe to pass 
through Ukraine. The crises in 2006 and 2009 highlighted the importance of energy 
security in Europe and the unreliability of Russia as a supplier country.317 In this regard, 
Europe is attempting to diversify its source of energy supplies. In terms of energy, the 
Nabucco pipeline is the one of the most important projects for Europe.318  
From Turkey’s perspective, the Nabucco project has essential importance. 
Turkey is also heavily dependent on Russian natural gas and trying to diversify its energy 
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supplies as is Europe. Furthermore, Nabucco is a cornerstone for the energy hub policies 
of Turkey.319 Turkey plays a crucial role as a pivotal state in the Nabucco project from 
the perspective of Europe and the United States, a strong supporter of the Nabucco 
project.320 
However, the Nabucco project faces many obstacles. First, is financial. 
The cost of Nabucco is about 7.9 billion as a preliminary estimate, but it is expected to 
rise to at least $11 billion and it is still uncertain who pay this amount.321 Second is who 
will supply the Nabucco. According to the official on-line site of the Nabucco project, 
“this route offers a wide range of supply sources for Nabucco gas pipeline, getting gas 
from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Russia and from Iran at a later point 
in time. Furthermore, it remains to be seen if also gas from Iraq will be linked with the 
Nabucco pipeline system.”322 There are several debates on this issue. Iran presents the 
most difficulty on this issue due to its ongoing dispute with the United States. The United 
States has stated that it sees no place for Iranian gas in a Southern energy corridor and 
Nabucco is one leg of the Southern energy corridor. Iraq is another problem. It still has 
difficulties on territorial integrity as well as insurgencies. There are always sabotages on 
the pipelines. So, the security of pipelines is difficult for Iraq to arrange even though 
former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki suggested to 15 billion cubic meters for 
Nabucco.323 A third problem with Nabucco is Eurasian suppliers. All central Asian 
countries are heavily dependent on Russia in terms of transportation of energy. Also, the 
Georgian war in 2008 demonstrated that the West is too weak to protect these countries 
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from Russian aggressive policy. So, if the West wants to realize the Nabucco, it should 
give strong incentives to Eurasian countries.324 
Despite all these problems, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in 
Ankara on July 13 2009,325 which means that Nabucco is still at the centre of European 
diversifying prospects for oil and gas distribution. 
b.  Turkey-Greece Interconnector 
In 2003, an intergovernmental agreement was signed between Greece and 
Turkey. The construction of a pipeline started in 2005 and was completed in 2007. 
Natural gas delivery started on November 18, 2007.326 Also, the project will be extended 
to Italy. In 2007, a trilateral intergovernmental agreement was signed. The capacity of the 
pipeline is expected to reach 11 billion cubic meters, 3 billion cubic meters for Turkey 
and 8 billion cubic meters for Greece and Italy.327 The source of the pipeline’s product 
will be Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Natural Gas reserves. The extension to Italy is expected 
to be operational in 2012.328 
The Turkey-Greece interconnector is another important pipeline, about 
which Europe and Turkey’s goals converge. The project is the first leg of the “South 
European Gas Ring project” of Europe’s INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to 
Europe) program. 329 The South European Gas Ring’s aim is to transport natural gas from 
the Caspian Basin, Russia, the Middle East, southern Mediterranean countries and other 
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international sources via Turkey and Greece to Europe with energy security.330 From  
Turkey’s perspective, it is an important project in order to reach European markets as 
well as to allow Turkey to become an energy hub for Europe.331 Another important 
significance of the project is that it is initiated, supported and favored by European 
states.332 
D.  RELIABILITY 
Reliability is an important issue in terms of energy security. Western countries as 
the major energy consumers in the world have concerns about energy exporters’ 
reliability as well as that of transit countries, because of the unpredictability of 
interruption of supplies by internal political turmoil as in the Russia-Ukraine example.333 
In this regard, Turkey has a pivotal position, because Turkey is one of the few 
countries in the region where Western institutions are the most developed.334 Turkey has 
had strong ties and a special relationship with the United States for more than fifty years. 
Turkey and United States share common interests in promoting peace, stability, and 
democratic values in the Middle East and Caspian regions, which are energy rich, but 
democracy poor regions.335 Turkey also maintains strong economic and political ties as a 
member of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
NATO.  It is a Customs Union member with the European Union. Beyond all of this, 
Turkey’s policy of “zero problems” towards its neighbors contributes to the peace in the 
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region and the reliable position of Turkey in the region.336 Turkey’s energy policy is 
based on turning Turkey in to an energy hub and terminal by using Turkey’s geostrategic 
position within the framework of the regional cooperation process.337 
Because of all these issues and Turkey’s relatively stabile domestic politics 
Turkey can be seen as one of the most reliable countries in its region in terms of secure 
transit routes for energy.  
E.  ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE OF TURKEY 
The energy infrastructure of Turkey is in relatively good condition. Turkey has 
four main oil refineries, two underground natural gas storage facilities and the Ceyhan 
terminal for natural gas and oil. Also, Turkey’s domestic pipeline network has grown 
with the international pipeline connections. (See Figure 3.1)338 
1.  Refineries 
Even though Turkey does not have significant oil resources, it has a considerable 
oil refining capacity and it is a refined oil exporter country. Turkey sells a third of its 
refined oil to OECD countries, and another third to Middle Eastern countries.339 
Turkey has four refineries. They are Aliaga in Izmir, Izmit, Kirikkale and Batman. 
All these refineries belong to Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporations. Turkey’s total 
refinement capacity is 28.1 million tonnes per year. In 2009, Turkey refined 16.98 
million tonnes of crude oil. However, the amount decreased due to the lack of demand 
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because of the worldwide economic recession. 340 Total sales of petroleum products by 
the refineries in 2008 was 25,957 thousands tonnes. 341 
According to the Energy Market Regulatory Authority in Turkey, there are 
several companies that have applied to open new refineries; they are Calik Energy and 
Indian Oil company (IOC). Also, there are some ventures to build a new refinery at the 
Ceyhan oil terminal by TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation). If it manages to build a 
$15 billion refinery in Ceyhan, Ceyhan will have the refinement capacity of 35 million 
tonnes of crude oil alone.342  Turkey’s oil refinement capacity, therefore, will be doubled.  
2.  Underground Storage 
Turkey imports natural gas from importer countries under the “take-or-pay” 
regulations. Because of these regulations, even though Turkey’s demand in summer 
decreases, Turkey had to pay the same amount of money for natural gas in summer as in 
winter. Thus, Turkey has started to build natural gas storage facilities. These natural gas 
facilities are important not only for storing the prepaid natural gas, but also for reducing 
the vulnerabilities of Turkey’s supply interruptions during crises such as those of Russia 
and Ukraine in 2006 and in 2009.343 
The very first natural gas storage was North Marmara and Degirmenkoy Natural 
Gas Underground Storage. Its capacity is 1.6 billion cubic meters. It became operational 
in 2007.344 Turkey also plans to increase its current capacity by 77 percent by the end of 
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2014.345 A second important natural gas storage project is the Salt Lake Natural Gas 
underground project. Its storage capacity will be 1 billion cubic meters and its main goal 
will be to meet the gas supply deficit that is expected in years to come.346 
These two underground storage facilities are very important for increasing energy 
security. During a crisis period, underground natural gas storage can reduce the 
vulnerabilities of Turkey, as well as other consumer countries if storage is expanded. 
3.  Ceyhan Oil Terminal 
The Ceyhan oil terminal has emerged as a major energy supplier for the Baku-
Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.347 Beside the BTC pipeline, the Iraq-Turkey crude oil 
pipeline also ends at the Ceyhan oil terminal. Moreover, there are other projects, such as 
the Samsun-Ceyhan oil bypass projects, extension of the Blue Stream gas pipeline and 
the Turkey Israel energy corridor project, which make Ceyhan an even bigger hub of 
energy supply.348 According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ceyhan 
terminal will become the largest outlet terminal in the eastern Mediterranean by the 
completion of these projects and by which it is anticipated that 6 to 7 percent of the 
global oil supply will transit Turkey.349   
The Ceyhan terminal is important not only because of the pipeline projects, but 
also its infrastructure. The Ceyhan terminal already has a modern tanker loading and 
storage facility that can handle the largest tankers in service. Its handling capacity is far 
more than that of the Bosphorus and the Russian oil terminal of Novorossiysk on the 
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Black Sea.350 Another important feature of Ceyhan is its warm climate, which lets 
Ceyhan operate 365 days annually. On the other hand, the Russian oil terminal of 
Novorossiysk’s cold climate requires it to close, usually two months in a year.351 
In addition to the Ceyhan oil terminal’s infrastructure, there are ongoing projects 
to build several refineries and gas storage facilities at the Ceyhan terminal.352 According 
to the Energy Market Regulatory Authority, it is planned to invest for a new refinery 
about 15 billion dollars in Ceyhan. In this respect, it is expected that Ceyhan will be an 
energy hub with the capacity to process 35 million tonnes of crude oil.353 All these 
projects make the Ceyhan terminal attractive as an energy hub.  
F.  A GROWING ENERGY MARKET 
Turkey is undeniably a substantial energy market.354 Turkey’s energy needs 
increase at 6 to 8 percent per year355 due to its increasing industrialization and 
population. Oil and natural gas meet the main share of the Turkey’s energy requirements. 
Turkey imports the 93 percent of its oil requirements and 97.3 percent of its natural gas 
requirements from Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea Basin countries and the Middle East.356 
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Since Turkey possesses almost no recoverable oil and gas reserves, it will remain 
for the foreseeable future an importer of oil and gas.357 Furthermore, Turkey is a fast 
growing market in terms of economy. For that reason, since the mid 1990s, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce has described Turkey as a “Big Emerging Market.”358 Thus, 
Turkey’s heavy reliance on imported hydrocarbon energy sources, specifically oil and 
natural gas, is the biggest long-term challenge for Turkey, if Turkey wants to maintain its 
economic growth. For that reason, Turkey spent $35 billion on oil and gas imports in 
2007.359 
All these reasons make Turkey an attractive energy market for the energy rich 
Caspian area, Russia and the Middle East.360 Turkey’s energy hub policy contributes to 
the energy rich countries as well as to Turkey’s and the West’s energy security in this 
respect. Because Turkey needs energy urgently, it is difficult for Turkey to cut off the 










                                                 
357  Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 101. 
358  Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and the United States: Anatomy of a Strategic Relationship," in The 
Future of Turkish Foreign Politics, ed. Lenore G., and Dimitris Keridis Martin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2004), 92. 
359  Greg Bruno, "Turkey at An Energy Crossroads," Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 
2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17821/. 
360  Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 101. 
 76



















IV.  WHY NOT TURKEY? 
Energy pipelines are the most important part of Turkey’s energy policy. Turkey 
seeks to become an energy hub in its region by exploiting its location. However, the 
achievement of this goal has been challenged by several factors. These challenges 
threaten Turkey’s energy policies in its region. These challenges can be separated in two 
ways. First are external challenges. External challenges are mainly the instability 
problems of the supplier countries. Especially countries in the Caspian Sea Basin and the 
Middle East have many problems regarding instabilities such as ethnic tensions.361 
Other than instability, regional powers’ aggressive policies to hold the region 
under their control create threats to Turkey’s energy policies. In this regard, Russia’s 
aggressive foreign policy in Eurasia, especially Russia’s ability to manipulate ethnic 
tension, is the main threat for Turkey. For instance, the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 
occurred due to South Ossetia’s declaration of independence, and caused a short-time 
interruption of the flow of oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.362 
If external challenges are not considered, the most important challenge for 
Turkey’s aims is the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) Terrorist Organization. It is a 
terrorist organization that Turkey has been fighting against for more than thirty years. 
The PKK’s attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2008 raised questions about 
Turkey as an energy hub.363 
These external and internal challenges affect Turkey’s aim to become an energy 
hub in its region. It affects mainly the investors since these problems make them consider 
pipeline routes other than Turkey’s. For that reason, Turkey has been trying to persuade 
investors that despite the challenges Turkey is the best option as an energy hub in terms 
of energy security. 
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A.  EXTERNAL CHALLENGES  
1. Instability in Middle East 
Turkey still imports most of its crude oil from the Middle East. Furthermore, 
Turkey seeks to import some natural gas from the Middle East. For that reason, Turkey 
has be trying to sign agreements with Iraq, Qatar, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. However, 
this dependence on the Middle East makes Turkey vulnerable to regional developments 
and creates unbalanced trade structures.364 Even though the Turkish economy does not 
rely largely on the Middle East, Turkey’s substantial oil, and natural gas dependence 
creates an unbalanced trade structure. Turkey’s economy may be vulnerable to 
disruptions of oil and gas supplies that could result from Middle East crises.365 
Consequently, these disruptions affect countries that may have chosen Turkey as a transit 
country for energy. 
Turkey shares three of its borders with three Middle Eastern countries. They are 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. It is no wonder that Turkey has concerns about these three countries. 
Other than these Middle Eastern countries, the Middle East is indigenously an unstable 
region. Over the last few decades, and before, the Middle East has been a scene of 
conflicts: the Arab-Israeli wars between 1967 and 1973, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, the Gulf war in 1991, and the Iraq war in 2003. 
Moreover, all these wars caused disruptions of the transportation of energy directly or 
indirectly.366 The Arab Israeli wars caused the disruption of oil transportation and high 
oil prices. The Iranian Revolution caused the isolation of Iran and Iran’s energy sector 
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from the world. The Gulf war caused the curtailment of oil flows from the Iraq-Turkey 
oil pipeline by United Nations’ sanctions of which the cost was $35 billion for Turkey.367 
For Turkey, Iran and Iraq are the most vulnerable part of Turkey’s energy 
ambitions. Turkey imports a high quantity of natural gas and oil from Iran. However, Iran 
has tension with Western countries due to the nuclear weapons issue. Turkey imports 
small amounts of oil from Iraq, but Turkey has aims for Iraq to exploit Iraq’s untapped 
large natural gas reserves and galvanize the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline as before the 
Gulf war in 1991. Furthermore, Turkey has goals to carry natural gas and oil from Iran 
and Iraq to Western markets. Focal points of problems related to Iran and Iraq for Turkey 
are Iraq’s Kurd region and the sabotage against the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline by 
insurgents in Iraq and Iran-United States tense relations. Turkey is hoping to balance 
either its concerns about Iraqi Kurds’ ambitions to become independent and/or the tense 
relations between Iran and the United States.368 
a. Iraq 
Turkey has mainly two concerns about Iraq. First of them is the Kurdish 
ambitions of becoming independent. Second is the sabotage on Iraq-Turkey crude oil 
pipelines by insurgents. 
After the Gulf war in 1991, Northern Iraq posed a series of challenges for 
Turkey. First of all, Turkey wanted all Iraqi Kurds to remain at home for fear of refugee 
flow such as in 1987. In 1987, between 40,000 and 50,000 Iraqi Kurds moved to Turkey. 
Second, Turkey did not want to see the emergence of a separate Kurdish entity in 
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state as both a model and a source of inspiration for Turkey’s own Kurdish population. 
Third, Turkey does not want a created heaven in northern Iraq for the separatist Kurdish 
Worker’s Party (PKK) terrorist organization.369 
For these reasons, Turkey wanted the United Nations and United States to 
stop the flood of Kurdish refugees to Turkey in 1991. Any repetition of 1987 Kurdish 
refugee flood could have caused unforeseeable consequences for Turkey’s domestic 
stability and its international relations. Thus, Turkey reluctantly accepted “Operation 
Provide Comfort,” which was to provide a safer place for the Kurdish population against 
Saddam Hussein’s aggressive policy against Kurds. Turkey allowed the idea of leaving 
developments in northern Iraq to the political skill and ambitions of the Iraqi Kurds and 
of providing Turkish NATO facilities for allied air control.370 So PKK has found a 
heaven for itself, which had been protected by the U.S., which Turkey supported the 
creation of a free area for the Kurds of Iraq. In this respect, Turkey itself contributed to 
the creation of the situation. 
Another important aspect is the Kirkuk issue. Kirkuk has the second most 
important oil reserves in northern Iraq. Turkey wants to ensure all Iraqi oil is placed 
under centralized control of central government rather than a federal Kurdish government 
in northern Iraq. In this way, Turkey is trying to prevent a Kurdish government from 
using revenues from Kirkuk to strengthen its own autonomy or even future 
independence.371 
Therefore, Turkey sees Iraq’s future territorial integrity as vitally 
important to its own security and stability, fearing an irredentist contamination among its 
own Kurdish population, if the Kurdish region of Iraq were to gain formal independence. 
However, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion confirmed Turkish fears of Kurdish separatism in 
northern Iraq and created unprecedented instability on its borders. With the events 
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spiraling out of control, Turkey sought a greater role in Iraq with the aim of protecting its 
interests and influencing the future direction of its neighbor. Gradually, through its 
growing network of political contacts and trade links, Turkey has become a force of 
stability.372  
Turkey has ambitions to exploit Iraq’s huge oil and natural gas reserves 
and carry them to Europe through Turkey by pipelines, an important part of Turkey’s 
energy hub aims. However, anything related to the Kurdish region’s independence can 
cause instability in Turkey and the region, or even a war between Turkey and Iraq. 
The intensity of attacks on Iraqi oil pipelines, oil installations and oil 
personnel by insurgents is another major problem with Iraq.373 There have been 469 
attacks on Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipelines and other oil installations from 2003 to 
2008.374 This situation is also a big concern for Turkey because even if Turkey and Iraq 
manage to establish a natural gas pipeline parallel to the existing crude oil pipeline and 
have the oil pipeline reach the pre-Gulf war level Iraq must ensure the security of the 
pipeline. If Turkey and Iraq cannot manage to do so, it will have a negative effect on 
Turkey’s energy hub policies. 
b.  Iran-U.S. Relations 
Iran is another important issue for Turkey’s ambitions to become an 
important energy hub from east to west. Iran has the third largest oil reserves and second 
largest natural gas reserves.375 Turkey seeks to exploit Iran’s huge reserves in favor of 
Turkey’s energy hub goals.  
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Iran is not only an important hydrocarbon reserve but also an important 
potential energy corridor for the Caspian Sea’s landlocked energy rich countries. 
Considering the enormous cost of new pipelines, Iran is one of the most viable and 
economically practical alternatives for exporting oil and gas from the Caspian Sea Basin 
landlocked energy rich countries. First, the Iran route would bypass the politically 
unstable areas of the Caucasus.376 Second, Iran’s unique geographical position between 
Caucasia, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Turkey, Iraq 
and Pakistan makes Iran a perfect natural bridge between the regions.377 Another 
important advantage of Iran is the already present pipeline networks, refineries and the 
ports on the Caspian Sea. The pipeline network and port infrastructure on the Caspian 
coast are largely in place or can be provided at reasonable cost and time. Iran’s existing 
refineries at Tabriz, Teheran, Arak, and Isfahan could receive oil from the north.378 
For all these reasons, Turkey is seeking investments in Iran in terms of 
energy. Turkey’s biggest import from the Middle East is Iran’s natural gas and Iran’s oil. 
Turkey wants to carry Iranian gas to Europe via Greece. Turkey, Iran and Greece have 
already signed agreements on this. According to the project plans that Iran and Turkey 
signed, new oil and gas wells will be drilled and the transportation of energy to Europe 
via Turkey and Greece will be by existing gas pipelines currently crossing Turkey. 
Turkey also has plans to facilitate the export of Iranian oil via pipelines to the Ceyhan 
terminal in the Mediterranean. The European Union strongly supports Iranian energy 
imports to lessen extreme dependence on Russian energy sources.379 
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However, Iran, Turkey and the European Union have an obvious 
disadvantage on transportation of Iranian energy sources: The United States’ Iran 
Sanctions Act (ISA).380 
According to the ISA, any investment above $20 million by any company 
will be subject to sanctions by the United States. In this respect, construction of energy 
routes to or through Iran is subject to sanctions; such routes will help Iran to develop its 
petroleum resources and its nuclear weapons program.381 
Despite the sanctions, Turkey has been importing natural gas from Iran via 
a natural gas pipeline since 2001, and has signed a new agreement with Iran to carry 
more gas and oil from Iran to Europe. This situation is creating tension between the 
United States and Turkey and can cause disruption if the United States strongly opposes 
Turkey’s ambitions to exploit Iran’s natural gas and oil in favor of itself and Iran. 
2.  Instability in the Caspian Sea Basin Area 
The Caspian Sea states are landlocked, so they need to cooperate with their 
neighbors for pipeline outlets for hydrocarbon exports. Pipelines provide investments, 
jobs, royalties, long-term access to energy sources and considerable political and 
economic leverage.382 
Without a pipeline, the Caspian Sea states do not have a means of getting energy 
resources out of the region to the world’s energy markets and they remain dependent on 
old system of selling oil and gas to Russia. This situation makes the Caspian Sea states 
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dependent on Russia’s leverages and the situation creates a great deal of ethnic tension in 
the region of more than one hundred ethnic groups.383 
There are many ethnic conflicts in the region: The Georgian regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia; the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan; Kazakhstan’s large ethnic Russian population; and, Chechnya. Apart from 
these problems, the legal status of the Caspian Sea is another important source of the 
tension.384 
The worst thing is that Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have 
demonstrated that the disputes between the ethnicities can easily turn into wars.385 
a.  Nagornho-Karabakh Issue  
Dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has a 
direct relation with Turkey. After the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey has been on the Azerbaijan side and closed its borders and 
diplomatic ties with Armenia. Thus, Russian backed Armenia and Turkish backed 
Azerbaijan’s relationship have direct links to Turkey’s situation in this region.  
For both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the state building process has been 
shaped by the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. After the independence of Azerbaijan, 
there was a conflict between the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
Azerbaijan government. However, Armenia entered the conflict and took control of 
almost one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory by 1993. The Minsk Group of the Organization 
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for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has tried to establish peace between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, but the OSCE has failed.386 
Turkey is on the side of Azerbaijan due to the close ethnic and cultural 
relations with Azerbaijan, and has closed its borders and frozen diplomatic relations with 
Armenia.  
When the war stopped, Armenia was the indisputable victor. It has 
occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Since Azerbaijan’s military was too week 
to challenge the Armenian military, the result has been the stable status quo.387 However, 
Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon export based economy has been developed and natural gas and 
oil pipelines have resulted in the development of Azerbaijan’s economy. Thus, 
Azerbaijan’s military budget is fed by petro-dollars. For that reason, in Azerbaijan, some 
thoughts of getting Nagorno-Karabakh back and taking revenge on Armenia are 
reemerging. The balance of power is shifting by petro-dollars in favor of Azerbaijan.388 
For Turkey and Europe, any war in the Caucasus between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia would cause a disaster in terms of energy. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
and Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline come from Azerbaijan. A war would cause 
the stop of oil and natural gas. Also, a war could destroy all plans of the areas which were 
thought of becoming an east-west corridor between Europe and energy rich Eurasia. 
Furthermore, a war would mean the end of the Nabucco pipeline project, which is one of 
the most important projects in terms of energy security for Europe and Turkey. 
Moreover, a war could make Europe and Turkey much more dependent on Russian gas 
and oil due to the disruption of energy flows from Eurasia. 
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b.  Georgia-Abkhazian-South Ossetia 
Georgia is comprised of various ethnic groups, each with their own 
language and religion. Georgia is distinguished by the existence of a high number of 
autonomous entities in its territory. Abkhazians in the northwest, South Ossetians in 
north-central part of Georgia, and Muslim Ajarians in the southwest of Georgia are the 
most important ethnic groups in Georgia... All of them have their autonomous status.389 
Consequently, there have always been ethnic tensions between these groups and 
Georgians themselves. 
Georgia has had a crucial place in history and now has a role as a link 
between the regions of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe. It is the only country,   
along with Russia, which has ports on the sea in the region. It is not landlocked as are 
other Eurasian countries. It is one of the transit routes for the landlocked countries of 
Eurasia.390 Thus, Georgia holds a crucial position in pipeline politics, geographically, as 
the most logical and economical export route for oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan and 
other Eurasian countries to the Black Sea, Turkey and Europe.391 
However, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have weakened 
Georgia as an energy transit country. Because of the Russia-Georgian war in 2008, the 
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline was closed for a time. This   has raised questions 
concerning the energy security of Europe and Turkey. The conflict and pipeline closure 
demonstrated the willingness of Russia to regain its influence on its near abroad. 
Furthermore, it demonstrated the weakness of the West against Russian assertive policies 
in terms of energy.392 Moreover, the situation demonstrated the manipulative power of 
Russia on the ethnicities of the region.  
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Georgia has the backbone of the South Caucasus pipeline system 
comprised of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Supsa oil pipeline and Baku-
Tblisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline. These pipelines were closed during the war. Thus, 
while Georgia suffered from the war, energy supplier and energy consumer countries also 
suffered from the lack of energy transportation through Georgia.393 Georgia has a special 
role in terms of energy security and the energy hub policy of Turkey. If a disruption 
occurs in Georgia, in terms of energy it affects Turkey directly. 
c.  Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is one of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence. It 
has significant amounts of oil and gas reserves, but it is located between Russia and 
Central Asia and has difficulties accessing international transport routes.394 
Kazakhstan and Russia share a 5,000-mile border. Moreover, ethnic 
Russians form 20 percent of the population. Thus, Russia has the opportunity to 
manipulate and to stir up ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.395 Aside from Russian influence 
on ethnic Russians, Kazakhstan’s economy is highly dependent on Russia. Especially its 
oil and natural gas economy is dependent on Russia’s pipeline system even though 
Kazakhstan contributes oil to the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline.396 
Russia does not want to leave Kazakhstan due to its huge amount of oil 
and gas reserves, nor does it want a former Soviet country to become a rival in terms of 
energy exports.397 Therefore, Russia has tried to take Kazakhstan under control. 
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d.  Legal Status of Caspian Sea Basin 
During the time of the Soviet Union, Iran and the Soviet Union had signed 
two agreements on demarcation of the Caspian Sea, in 1921 and 1940. Because of the 
demise of the Soviet Union, a new agreement should be signed between the new littoral 
states. However, the vast energy resources of the Caspian Sea have caused a   dispute 
over the demarcation of the sea.398 
All five littoral states have different thoughts of sharing the Caspian Sea. 
The common point is to get a larger share of the Caspian Sea. If the Caspian is defined as 
a sea, according to 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS, 
littoral states can claim rights of sovereign waters up to twelve miles from shore and an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within 200 miles from the coast. If the Caspian is 
defined as a lake, the littoral states will divide the water’s resources equally between 
them.399 
Russia supports the agreements that were signed during the Soviet times 
between Iran and the Soviet Union. According to Russia, the Caspian Sea is not a sea 
covered by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
because the Caspian is in fact a “special inner sea” and has no natural connection with 
any other sea.400 Therefore, according to Russia, it should be treated like a lake. Russia 
will have a larger portion of the Sea if it is accepted as a lake rather than a sea.401 
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Iran somewhat supports the idea of a lake, but it has contended that the oil 
and gas in the seabed would not be utilized except by the consensus of the five littoral 
states.402 Therefore, Iran would have access to the energy rich oil fields of the middle of 
the Caspian Sea.403 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan support the idea of a sea. According to them, 
the Caspian Sea should be treated as a sea under the UNCLOS of 1982, which defines the 
Caspian as a semi enclosed or enclosed sea.404 By the UNCLOS description, both of 
them can keep their large offshore resources and do not need to share their offshore 
reserves.405 
Turkmenistan has not made a clear decision on this issue. It maintains 
both stands. Its only concern is the dispute with Azerbaijan on several major oilfields 
such as the Kapaz (Serdar) and Chirag oil fields.406 
The dispute on the demarcation of the Caspian States has added further 
geopolitical tension in terms of peace and energy security. Because of this dispute, 
Caspian Sea resources cannot be exploited and any pipeline under the Caspian Sea such 
as the Trans-Caspian cannot be built until a consensus between the littoral states is 
reached. Thus, the Caspian Sea is another potential source of friction and tension in 
Eurasia in terms of energy security. 
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3.  Russia’s Foreign Policy 
Russia, as a natural gas and oil supplier, has pursued an aggressive foreign policy 
to hold its influence over Eurasia and its regional hegemony.407 For holding its energy 
hegemony, Russia demonstrated how serious it is by the Russia-Georgia war, cut-offs of 
natural gas to Ukraine and Belarus, some rumors that Russia had been involved helping 
Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and helping the PKK, the terrorist organization, 
in Turkey. An analyst from Stratfor Intelligence Service has described Russia’s 
aggressive policy in terms of energy with these words: 
“Moscow got its point across: Europe can sink its money into projects designed to 
leave Russia in the cold (mainly east-west energy corridor projects like Baku-Tblisi-
Ceyhan, Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum, and Nabucco), but the Russians still have the will and 
capacity to disrupt many of these projects.”408 
Russia has mainly two reasons to legitimize its aggressive foreign policy. These 
are economic and political. Russia purchases Eurasian, mainly Central Asian, natural gas 
and then sells it and its own natural gas to Europe at higher prices. Thus, all this natural 
gas goes through Russian soil. This situation makes Russia dependent on a continuing 
and reliable flow of natural gas from former Soviet States. If former Soviet States 
diversify their exports, this can create a problem for Russia in terms of its economy.409 
Hence, Russia cannot afford any reduced energy market share since its economy receives 
a huge amount of energy benefit.410 
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The second reason is mainly political. Russia believes that the United States and 
the West are trying to dislodge Russia from Eurasia,411 which Russia considers it has 
historic rights over and sees as its “Near Abroad.”412 Because of this perception, Russia 
has pursued an aggressive policy towards Eurasia, the United States, Turkey and the 
West over Eurasia. Furthermore, Russia considers NATO’s expansion as a threat. Russia 
has stated that NATO’s expansion is a threat in its new military doctrine.413 
The United States and Europe see Russia as a threat and questions Russia about 
its foreign policy. The United States wants a “whole and free” Europe and Russia is the 
main threat against those foreign policy goals.414 From Europe’s side, Russia is a main 
concern. Europe uses its energy leverage to assert its foreign policy goals. The Russian-
Georgian war and natural gas cut-offs in Ukraine confirm Russia’s aggressive energy 
policy toward Europe. Russia uses its energy sources as a weapon to assert its policy.415 
However, Turkey is a different story for Russia’s foreign policy. Turkey is not as 
powerful as Europe or the United States, but pursues their policy goals. On the other 
hand, Turkey is an important outlet for Russia in terms of energy. For Turkey, Russia is 
an important energy supplier and important trading partner. Turkey is important for 
Russia to carry Russian natural gas and oil to Israel. In this picture, Turkey and Russia 
have many common interests. However, in Eurasia, Russia and Turkey are regional 
rivals,416 because Turkey is the main component of the United States’ east-west energy 
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corridor, which circumvents Russia. In this respect, Russia clashes with Turkey over 
Eurasia, which can be formulated as a zero-sum game.417 
The east-west energy corridor is the most important part of Turkey’s energy 
policy. It is the main component of Turkey’s energy hub concept. However, Russia seeks 
to prevent this energy hub with its aggressive policies. For that reason, Russia and Turkey 
have had disputes over the PKK and Chechen war. Both countries accused the other 
helping the PKK and the Chechens.418 
Another important point of Russia’s foreign policy is Russia’s ability to 
manipulate the minorities in Eurasia.419 Russia demonstrated its success in influence 
minorities in the Russia-Georgian war by manipulating Ossetians and Abkhazians,420  
and in Nagorno-Karabakh by manipulating Armenians.421 
All these aggressive acts by Russia create instability in Eurasia, an area that is 
important for Turkey’s energy hub policy. If Russia goes further and takes control of oil 
and natural gas flows from Eurasia to the west, there can be devastating results for 
Turkey’s energy policy.422 
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B.  INTERNAL CHALLENGES 
1.  PKK Sabotage on Pipelines 
In terms of terrorism, pipelines are relatively easy and effective targets for 
terrorists in the world.423 In Turkey, the most dangerous terrorist organization is the 
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which is a separatist Kurdish group conducting terrorist 
attacks against Turkey. 
Turkish officials and the Turkish military have been fighting against the PKK for 
more than thirty years. Turkey has been relatively successful against the PKK; however, 
the PKK has more advantages compared to Turkish officials because the PKK can use 
any means of pursuing its interests. One of these is sabotage against pipelines. 
The PKK have conducted several attacks on pipelines. In 1998, Mahir Valat, a 
representative of the National Salvation Front of Kurdistan in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe threatened Turkey: 
“The question is whether the oil will actually flow uninterrupted into pipes. 
Militants could ensure that the pipe becomes a sieve: its fate would depend on us and not 
on Turkey. We oppose the BTC pipeline construction as an element of Turkish expansion 
against our Motherland. To realize its plan, Turkey will have to completely destroy our 
armed formations. Let it try.”424 
The first sign of the attacks to come were those words. Later, the PKK sabotaged 
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik (Iraq-Turkey) oil pipeline, the Iran-Turkey natural gas pipeline, 
the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline and most recently, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline. All are very important for Turkey’s energy policy and goal of becoming an 
energy hub in its region.  
Secure transportation routes are the main component of energy security. Turkey 
wants to be an energy hub to connect energy rich Russia, Eurasia, and the Middle East 
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with energy hungry Europe. However, terrorist attacks, especially on the Baku-Tblisi-
Ceyhan pipeline that is the most important part of the east-west energy corridor, cause 
doubts within the mind of energy investors. Turkey needs to find a way to persuade 
investors about the reliability, security and stability of Turkey. Otherwise, energy 
investors may look for alternative routes to those of Turkey.425 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Until the oil crisis of 1973, energy was not a matter of foreign policy for Turkey. 
Even though Turkey does not have significant indigenous oil reserves, (oil was the main 
energy resource until late 1970s), cheap oil imported from the Middle East was enough 
for Turkey’s energy needs. However, while the oil crisis of 1973 caused an increase in 
the price of oil, it also quadrupled the cost of oil imports to Turkey.  While the increase of 
oil prices combined with Turkey’s growing consumption of oil, energy was the main 
foreign policy concern for the first time In Turkish history.  Turkey’s increased 
dependence on the Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries caused a shift in Turkey’s 
foreign policy from passive neutrality to a more active policy, especially economically. 
Following the oil crisis, Turkey started to rebuild economic bridges with the 
Middle East. First, Turkey negotiated with Iraq on an Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline and 
started to import crude oil from Iraq by that pipeline. In the mid-1980s, Turkey also 
turned its face to the north and negotiated with its Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, on 
importing natural gas via a pipeline through Bulgaria called the Trans-Balkan pipeline. In 
this way, oil and natural gas pipelines have become a political policy concern for Turkey.  
Until the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy on energy was related to meeting the 
increasing demand for energy. Its foreign policy concern was mainly related to getting 
cheaper oil and natural gas from the energy export-countries of the Middle East and the 
Soviet Union. However, in the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
opened the gate to a new era on energy. Newly independent states of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus resulted in new prospects for Turkey on energy and regional leadership. Turkey 
immediately tried to increase its influence on Central Asian and Caucasus countries due 
to its close ethnic and cultural ties. For that reason, sometimes it is said that the twenty-
first century is the “Turkish Century” which has caused the blossoming of Pan-Turkism. 
However, Turkey quickly became aware of the hardship of becoming a leading power for 
those countries due to its lack of economic capacity to help newly independent Turkic  
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States. Even though the demise of the Soviet Union opened new opportunities for 
Turkey’s becoming a regional power, it was not enough for a pan-Turkic empire or 
union. 
Before the early 1990s, Turkey had met its increasing energy demand with Iraq-
Turkey crude oil and the Soviet Union’s natural gas pipelines. However, in the 1990s, 
Turkey’s energy needs continued to increase due to increasing industrialization and 
growing population. In addition, the close of the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline, which 
was the main oil supply for Turkey, by United Nations’ sanctions due to the Gulf war of 
1991, defeated Turkey’s energy policy. Thus, Turkey was forced to look for alternatives 
for energy. The opened gate of newly independent energy-rich Eurasian states, Europe’s 
increasing dependence on Russia in terms of energy, natural gas cut-offs in Ukraine and 
Belarus, the United States’ east-west energy corridor policy, and Turkey’s urgent high 
energy needs have driven Turkey to play an active role in pipeline politics which 
encourage the transport of oil and natural gas from the Middle East and Eurasia to Europe 
via Turkey. In addition to all these developments, the aggressive energy policy of Russia 
has raised the question of energy security.  
In this situation, the United States and Europe have considered Turkey a key 
component for their energy policies in terms of energy security due to  Turkey’s 
geographic location in the middle of Europe and the energy rich Middle East, Eurasia and 
Russia, and Turkey’s reliability in terms of democracy, stability, and the shared values of 
Europeans.. From Turkey’s perspective, this was a perfect opportunity for Turkey to meet 
its increasing energy demand and establish itself as a regional power. Thus, Turkey has 
exploited Europe and United States’ energy security policies in favor of itself and 
developed a new energy policy—the goal of which is to become an energy hub for 
Europe. For this reason, Turkey has signed agreements with Russia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Algeria, Nigeria and newly independent states of Eurasia.  
In the beginning of the 1990s, newly independent Eurasian states were at the 
center of the energy competition between the Turkey-United States alliance, and Russia 
and Iran. Newly independent states had no outlet other than Russia for selling their 
energy supplies. They are landlocked states, which do not have any access to 
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international transportation routes. Thus, they were heavily dependent on the old Russian 
pipeline network. The West seeks to build new pipelines to break the Russian monopoly 
of these energy rich states. Also, newly independent states of Eurasia are seeing 
alternative energy outlets for their energy supplies. Thus, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, and the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline were built and the Trans-
Caspian pipeline and Nabucco natural gas pipeline are planned to be built in ten years. 
All these developments are in favor of Turkey as an energy corridor from east to west. 
The West’s ventures to break Russia’s monopoly on energy have urged Russia to 
re-establish its authority over Russia’s “near abroad.” While the West has begun to 
establish new pipelines to implement its east-west energy corridor from Eurasia to 
Europe through Turkey, Russia has used its power to manipulate ethnic tensions within 
the Eurasian states as trump card against the West’s energy policies. South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan are the 
best examples of Russian power used to manipulate ethnic tensions in favor of itself. 
Russia also has used the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against Turkey while 
Turkey used Chechens against Russia in terms of rivalry. However, even so, in the late 
1990s, Turkey and Russia began to cooperate on energy transportation. Turkey needed 
energy and Russia needed outlets for energy exports. Turkey provides a good opportunity 
as an outlet with its highly increasing industrialization and population. So, 
interdependence between Russia and Turkey has been established on energy. Turkey 
imports natural gas via the Trans-Balkan and Blue Stream natural gas pipelines, and oil, 
and exports many economic commodities to Russia. Furthermore, Russia and Turkey 
now seek an energy transportation corridor from north, Russia, to south, Israel. Thus, the 
intensity of interdependence between Russia and Turkey has increased by the north-south 
axis of an energy corridor. 
Turkey also signed agreements with Iran on importing natural gas. Iran already 
provides most of Turkey’s oil. Now, Turkey also imports natural gas from Iran.  For that 
reason, Turkey and Iran constructed a natural gas pipeline from Tebriz in Iran to Erzurum 
in Turkey. Through the energy agreements, Turkey and Iran have increased trade 
relations. Also, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement on carrying Turkmenistan’s natural 
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gas to Europe through Iran and Turkey. However, the close relationship between Iran and 
Turkey has upset the United States due to the United States’ isolation policies against 
Iran. Despite the United States’ opposition, Turkey and Iran have continued their close 
relationship on energy and economy. Moreover, Turkey expects Iran’s participation in 
the Nabucco natural gas agreement due to Iran’s large natural gas reserves. This situation 
has created a heavy interdependence between Iran and Turkey, which is in favor of 
regional peace.  
Turkey signed crude oil and natural gas agreements with Iraq, too. Turkey wants 
to exploit the untapped natural gas reserves of Iraq and reach the maximum levels of the 
Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipelines’ capacities. Also, Turkey wants to add Iraq to the 
Nabucco natural gas project.  
Turkey signed an agreement, not only with Iraq from the Middle East, but also 
with Egypt and Qatar on natural gas transportation. By the agreements with Egypt and 
Qatar, Turkey seeks establishment of south-north energy transportation corridor along 
with the east-west and north-south energy corridors. The oil and natural gas pipelines will 
connect all these corridors to each other. According to this policy, Turkey will stay at the 
center of these energy corridors and Turkey will be promoted from a transit country to 
the hub of an energy network. 
However, there are many obstacles to Turkey’s energy hub policies in contrast to 
the advantages to Turkey. Ethnic tensions in Eurasia and the Middle East, Russia’s 
aggressive energy policies despite the cooperation with Turkey, The United States’ 
isolation policies towards Iran, and the terrorist organization of the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) against Turkey’s stability are the main challenges for Turkey. However, 
Turkey still is one of the best options in terms of energy security despite these challenges. 
Turkey is the only country that has close relationships with the energy competitors of the 
United States, Russia, Iran, Europe, and newly independent states of Eurasia. In this 
regard, Turkey is the only common link to all these competitors whose interests converge 
on Turkey in terms of energy transportation. In addition, Turkey’s energy security 
concerns overlap those of Europe. Turkey has a fortuitous location between energy-
consumer Europe and the energy-rich Middle East, Eurasia and Russia Turkey is reliable 
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as a democratic and stable country, which has established international oil and natural gas 
pipelines. Turkey has an energy infrastructure, and Turkey’s own highly increasing 
energy demand already promotes Turkey as a key player in respect to energy security. 
In respect to the future, the demand for energy will continue to increase 
worldwide and the transportation of energy will remain as a main issue. Furthermore, 
Turkey will keep its place as a central part in the transportation of oil and natural gas if 
pipelines continue as the main means of transportation of oil and natural gas. Even 
though Turkey lacks indigenous oil and natural gas resources, Turkey’s key position for 
transportation of oil and natural gas provides many opportunities for Turkey to meet its 
own energy demand and establish peace in the highly unstable region by 
interdependence. If Turkey manages to connect more countries by pipelines, it can 
establish interdependence between the regional competitors, and can manage to avoid 
conflicts and provide more peace in the region.  
Turkey does not have significant energy resources. Turkey imports 90 percent of 
its oil demand and more than 90 percent of its natural gas demand. Therefore, Turkey 
will continue to be dependent on oil and natural gas imports if oil and natural gas keep 
their key positions as primary energy resources. Thus, it is almost impossible to think of a 
significant decrease in Turkey’s dependence on oil and natural gas imports. For that 
reason, Turkey is seeking long-term energy transportation agreements. Thus, Turkey will 
create interdependence among the energy consumer and energy rich countries and 
regions. This situation will contribute to interdependence and indirectly to peace in the 
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